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Genetic Testing:
Technology that Is Changing the Adoption Process
"The gurgling infant girl awaiting adoption seems healthy
now. But what surprises may be encoded in her DNA? Are
there flawed genes that predispose her to serious mental or
physical health problems - perhaps years from now - that
would not only cloud her life, but put a severe burden on her
adoptive parents?1
INTRODUCTION
"Tens of thousands of children are adopted in America each
year," 2 encompassing two to four percent of the American popula-
tion. 3 Given that new familial relationships are formed each day,
states have tried to foster the needs of the adoptee, the adoptive
parents, and the biological parents by enacting laws to further each
party's best interest during the adoption process.4 More specifi-
cally, legislators recognized that accurate health information re-
garding the adoptee was vital to fostering a new parent-child
relationship and revealing potential health concerns, now and in the
future, about the adoptee to the adoptive parents.5
Today, most states have enacted laws providing for the disclo-
sure of some medical information about the adoptee to adoptive
parents.6 However, most of the statutes governing health disclosure
for adoptions are either inaccurate or unclear. 7 Many times a lack
of medical information has tragically affected new familial relation-
ships physically, emotionally, financially, and it is the belief of most
1 Richard Saltus, DNA Tests Cast Shadow on Adoption Biotech Conference
Addresses Patients Rights and Ethics, BOSTON GLOBE, March 27, 2000, at Al.
2 Demosthenes Lorandos, Secrecy and Genetics in Adoption Law and Prac-
tice, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 277 (1996).
3 See E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN
THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 1 (1998).
4 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 277.
5 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 277.
6 See Marianne Brower Blair, The Uniform Adoption Act's Health Disclo-
sure Provisions: A Model that Should Not Be Overlooked, 30 FAM. L.Q. 427, 427
(1996) [hereinafter Blair, Uniform Adoption Act's Health Disclosure Provisions].
7 See id.
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adoptive parents that these tragedies could have been prevented if
accurate health information regarding the adoptee had been dis-
closed to them during the adoption process.8 Due to this unfortu-
nate reality, wrongful adoption suits have arisen in recent years
because of the adoption agency's failure to disclose important
health-related information about the adoptee. 9 Most adoptive par-
ents attribute these failures to inadequate state adoption laws.
Too many adoptive parents this problem has been solved with
the advances of the government-funded project known as the Hu-
mane Genome Project.10 With the recent completion of the first
phase of the Human Genome Project (a draft of an entire strand of
human DNA),11 the Human Genome Project has fostered rapid
technological advancements in genetic knowledge, thereby increas-
8 See id. at 428-31. As Blair points out:
In numerous instances, adopted children failed to receive appropri-
ate psychiatric or medical treatment they desperately needed be-
cause medical information that was readily available was not
revealed to the adoptive parents. As a result, children with psychi-
atric disorders that might have been successfully treated at a young
age were ultimately institutionalized as adolescents. Some children
mutilated themselves or attempted suicide. Some children with
physical or genetic disorders underwent painful, expensive, and
sometimes hazardous diagnostic testing that could have been
avoided, or received improper medical treatment that delayed re-
covery, and occasionally resulted in permanent disability. Siblings
in adoptive families have been raped, tortured, sexually molested,
and threatened by adoptive children whose parents were given no
warning about similar past behavior and problems of the child.
Adoptive families without adequate information were left totally
unprepared for, and emotionally devastated by their children's de-
structive behavior, fire-setting, violence, and threats.
9 See id. at 427.
10 See Human Genome Project Information, at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/
(last modified Jan. 12, 2001). As the website explains:
Begun in 1990, the U.S. Human Genome Project is a 13-year effort
coordinated by the U.S. Department of Energy and the National
Institutes of Health .... [The p]roject goals are to identify all the
approximate 50,000 genes in the human DNA, determine the se-
quences of the 3 billion chemical base pairs that make up human
DNA, store this information in databases, develop tools for data
analysis, transfer related technologies to the private sector, and ad-
dress the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) that may arise from
the project.
11 See Daniel Drell, The Human Genome Project: What a Legal Assistant
Needs to Know, 27 FAcrs & FINDINGS, THE J. FOR LEGAL ASSISTANTS (Feb. 7,
2001), http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/publicat/miscpubs/legalasst.html.
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ing the ability of geneticists to formulate tests to determine whether
an individual has a genetic-based disease or disease susceptibility. 12
Given this technology, geneticists are reporting requests from pro-
spective adoptive parents and state adoption agencies to perform a
series of genetic tests on the adoptee 13 during the adoption process,
which include testing these children for adult-onset diseases where
no current treatment or prevention exists.14 These requests by pro-
spective adoptive parents for genetic testing on an adoptee are in
direct response to curbing an existing problem of inadequacy in
state disclosure laws.15 It appears that as the range of available ge-
netic tests increase, more and more prospective adoptive parents
will ask to perform genetic tests on an adoptee. 16 This has led to
the heart of a growing legal debate as to whether an adoptee should
undergo genetic testing at the request of the prospective adoptive
parents.' 7
12 See ASHG/ACMG Report: Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and
Psychosocial Implications of Genetic Testing in Children and Adolescents, 57 AM. J.
HUM. GEN. 1233 (1995), http://www.faseb.org/genetics/ashg/policy/pol-13.htm
[hereinafter ASHG/ACMG Report].
13 The genetic tests described and will be discussed in this Note are
"presymptomatic testing to predict a child's future risk of developing a genetic
disease or of having a genetic predisposition for which no current treatment or
effective prevention exists." The scope of this article will not reach "the testing of
immediate benefit to the infant or minor, including newborn screening, disease
testing for a symptomatic condition in the child, or presymptomatic testing for
which treatment during childhood is available and beneficial." See Diane E. Hoff-
man & Eric A. Wulsberg, Testing Children for Genetic Predispositions: Is it in Their
Best Interest?, 23 J. L. MED. & ETH. 331, 332 (1995).
14 See Mary Z. Pelias & Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Testing in Adoption,
Joint Statement of the American Society of Human Genetics and the American
College of Medical Genetics, at http://www.faseb.org/genetics/ashg/policy/pol-
36.htm (visited Sept. 11, 2000).
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See Lori Andrews, As Medical Research Unlocks the Secrets of Genetics,
the Battle Over Who Can Have Access to Your Personal Life Story is Just Getting
Under Way in Courts and Legislatures, 83 A.B.A.J. 44, 45 (1997). The author ex-
plains that there is growing debate about whether one should undergo genetic test-
ing because two separate interests surround it. The two interests involved in this
growing debate are private individuals and social institutions. As Andrews
explains:
Individuals fear that that test results may be used against them by
employers, insurers, school officials, courts, mortgage lenders,
adoption agencies, the military, and other entities. At the same
time, those institutions claim that individuals are not entitled to de-
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
Human genes are a personal map for one's biological future,
whereby genetic information holds deep, personal implications for
each person.18 As a result, when prospective adoptive parents re-
quests an adoptee, before they are adopted, to be genetically tested
for a disease that does not manifest until the adoptee is an adult
and no effective treatment for the genetic disease exists, the
adoptee's substantive right to privacy is violated. The prospective
adoptive parents are basically requesting the performance of these
tests in a nonmedical context since nothing can be done to help the
adoptee, now or in the future, except to determine the child's life
expectancy. Thus, these genetic tests only serve the interests of
these third parties and not the adoptee. Furthermore, not only will
this type of genetic information violate an adoptee's substantive
right to privacy, but also the child will most likely suffer from dis-
crimination in the future by employers and insurers because of the
differences in the adoptee's genome. 19
This Note focuses on the right of the adoptee to prevent pro-
spective adoptive parents and state adoption agencies from testing
the adoptee for a predisposition or susceptibility for an untreatable,
adult-onset disorder, while the child is awaiting placement for adop-
tion.2 0 Part I examines the history of adoption and how state legis-
latures, adoption agencies, and prospective adoptive parents
recognized the need and importance of disclosing medical informa-
tion regarding the adoptee.21 Part II explores how genetic testing is
increasingly becoming a widespread presence in adoption proceed-
ings. Given the advances made in genetic testing, legislators have
begun to enact statutes requiring the collection of genetic informa-
tion of the biological parents in efforts to disclose accurate medical
prive them of information that could impact the institutions' own
interests.
18 See id. at 44.
19 See Jane K. Alper, Joseph S. Alper, & Marvin R. Natowicz, Genetic Dis-
crimination and the Law, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 465, 465 (1992) (describing ge-
netic as "discrimination against an individual or against members of that
individuals family solely because of real or perceived differences from the 'normal'
genome in the genetic constitution of that individual.").
20 See Joanna H. Fanos, Phillip R. Reilly, & Dorothy Wertz, Genetic Testing
for Children: Who Decides?, 272 JAMA 875, 880 (1994).
21 See Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil: A BluePrint for
Legislative Reform of the Disclosure of Health-Related Information in Adoption, 70
N.C. L. REV. 681, 686 (1992) [hereinafter Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil].
136
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information to the adoptive parents.22 Unfortunately, as many
scholars have noted, with this advancement the problem of inade-
quate disclosure laws has not been resolved2 3; to perform genetic
testing on the adoptee to determine the child's predisposition for
untreatable, adult-onset diseases will not solve this problem.24
Thus, Part III addresses that if a state statute allowed for an
adoptee to undergo genetic testing for an adult-onset, untreatable
disease, an adoptee's substantive right to privacy 25 would be vio-
lated because the testing is "an unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters fundamentally affecting the person. '26 In this
case, there is a paramount individual privacy interest in the genetic
information disclosed, since the genetic test, performed in a non-
medical context, reveals innate personal material about the child.27
Part IV examines how allowing the genetic testing of a child for
untreatable, adult-onset diseases while the child is awaiting adop-
tion will prove discriminatory for the child in the future with em-
ployers and insurers.28 Finally, Part V concludes the adoptee's
genetic makeup encompasses the child's substantive right of privacy
serving everyone's best interest involved in the adoption process,
most importantly, the adoptee.
22 See Lori Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Technolo-
gies, and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 128 (1998) ("An individ-
ual's genetic family history increasingly is being viewed as an important tool in
medical diagnosis and treatment. Such recognition led state legislatures to create
statutes requiring the collection of genetic information in the adoption context.").
23 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 278; See also Blair, Uniform Adoption Act's
Health Disclosure Provisions, supra note 6, at 427-28; See also Blair, Lifting the
Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 686-87.
24 See Julie Holland, Should Parents Be Permitted to Authorize Genetic Test-
ing for Their Children, FAM. L.Q. 321, 322 (1997) (discussing the pros and cons of
children being subject to certain genetic tests by their parents and the overall ef-
fects of genetically testing children).
25 The scope of this Note will not cover procedural due process in determin-
ing the issue of whether a guardian would be appointed to represent the best inter-
ests of the adoptee at a hearing to decide if the genetic tests to be preformed on
the adoptee is warranted. This Note will discuss how an adoptee should not be
genetically tested for untreatable, adult-onset disorders by prospective adoptive
parents because it violates the adoptee's substantive due process and discriminates
against the child in the future with regards to employment and insurance.
26 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1978) (declaring a Massachusetts
law that prohibited physicians to distribute contraceptives to unmarried individuals
unconstitutional).
27 See Mark Rothstein, The Use of Genetic Information for NonMedical Pur-
poses, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 109, 119 (1995).
28 See Holland, supra note 24, at 322.
138 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
1. THE TRADITION OF ADOPTION AND DISCLOSURE LAWS
Adoption emerged in the United States with the passage of the
Massachusetts statute, "An Act to Provide for the Adoption of
Children" in 1851.29 The Act introduced the "common law notion
that a parent-child relationship could be formed from a pattern of
behavior and a state of mind defined by the mutuality of an emo-
tional bond," irrespective of biological ties.30 The Act emphasized
the welfare of the child with due consideration to the interests of
the adoptive and biological parents,31 which has become the corner-
stone of modern adoption law. 32 Following the passage of the Mas-
sachusetts adoption statute, other states soon began to pass similar
adoption laws. 33
After the passage of the first adoption law in 1851, the issue of
concealing adoption records was nonexistent since most of the
adoption proceedings were informal. 34 It was not until the late
Nineteenth Century where a "united movement began to support
the strict confidentiality of adoption records. '35 Known as progres-
sivism, this movement sought "collective action and government in-
tervention for the reorganization and improvement of American
life."'36 Society began to view adoption with a cloud of shame due
29 Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAM. L. 677, 677
(1982) ("This Act has been hailed as the first general law of adoption in either
England or the United States and thus the first modern adoption law.").
30 Id.
31 See id.
32 See CARP, supra note 3, at 12.
33 See Kawashima, supra note 29, at 677-78 ("Twenty-four states passed simi-
lar adoption statutes within twenty-five years of passage of the Massachusetts
law.").
34 See Brett Silverman, The Winds of Change in Adoption Laws: Should
Adoptees have Access to Adoption Records?, 39 FAM. CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 85,
86-7 (2001).
35 Lorandos, supra note 2, at 295 ("During the Progressive Era, new adop-
tion laws focused on granting a new start for the state's adoptees and professional
organizations of social workers championed a number of new regulations. These
reforms were indicative of a united movement supporting strict confidentiality in
the adoption process.").
36 CARP, supra note 3, at 15. Carp describes in detail the Progressive Era:
Originating among a shifting coalition of mostly Protestant, newly
professionalized, middle class men and women, these 'evangelistic
modernizers' wedded a quasi-religious idealism and scientism in a
movement that worked for specific reforms while seeking to restore
America to a sense of community and common purpose. Progres-
sive reformers engaged in countless national and local campaigns to
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to the overriding stigma associated with the parties involved in the
adoption process.37 To protect the interests of the parties con-
cerned, adoption records began to be sealed and specific authoriza-
tion was required in order to disclose any information about the
adoptee. 38 Adoptions were viewed as the child receiving a new life,
where the child severs all ties with his or her biological family. 39
Social workers eliminated all traces of the adoptee's record and
treated the child as reborn.40 States considered enacting laws deny-
ing adoptees and their adoptive families access to any information
concerning the adoptee. 41 In 1917, Minnesota was the first state to
mitigate the impact of brutal factory conditions, concentrated eco-
nomic power, corrupt politics, crowded and unsanitary cities, and a
newly arrive, heterogeneous immigrant population... Progressives
set about to regulate big business, democratize and reform the po-
litical system, aid the urban poor and exploited workers, and im-
pose homogenous cultural values on the entire population.
37 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 294 ("Believing that secrecy was necessary
to protect birth mothers as well as children stigmatized by the 'shame of illegiti-
macy ... . "); See also Andrews & Elster, supra note 22, at 140 ("Until recently
each member of the adoption triangle was stigmatized: the birth mother was 'pro-
miscuous,' the child a 'bastard,' the adoptive parents 'barren.' ").
38 See Andrews & Elster, supra note 22, at 141. Andrews and Elster explain:
The rationales offered for maintaining the confidentiality of the
adoption record are as follows: assuring the biological parents an
opportunity to move on and attempt to rebuild their lives; enabling
adoptive parents to raise the child without fear of interference from
the natural parents and without fear that the birth status of an ille-
gitimate child will be revealed or used as a means of harming the
child or themselves; and protecting the child from any possible
stigma of illegitimacy ... insur[ing] that the relationship with his or
her new parents can develop into a loving and cohesive family unit
uninvaded by a natural parent who later wishes to intrude into the
relationship.
See also Silverman, supra note 34, at 87 (examining how the "beginnings of confi-
dentiality surfaced in 1916, when New York passed a law that required that the
term illegitimacy not appear in judicial transcripts").
39 See Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 695 ("For most of
the twentieth century adoption agencies commonly gave very limited information
about the medical and social background of a child and the child's biological family
to the adoptive parents ..... Adoption [was] aimed [at] building the illusion that
the child was born into the family.").
40 See Protecting the Rights of Hard to Place Children in Adoption, at http://
www.law.indiana.edu/ilj/v72/no4/ farmer.html (last updated May 22, 1997), [herein-
after Hard to Place Children].
41 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 294-95 ("[These new laws] denied adoptees
and their families access to information concerning birth records, health histories,
140 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
pass a law requiring all records of the adoptee to be sealed, even at
the request of the adoptee and the biological parents.42
By World War II, most states had passed statutes requiring the
concealment of all adoption records. 43 Legislators consistently sup-
ported secrecy laws in adoptions throughout the 1950s "on the be-
lief that confidentiality protected the privacy rights of all parties
involved. ' 44 Confidentiality protected adoptive parents from any
unwanted intrusion into their newly defined family, birth mothers
who desired anonymity to prevent any stigmatization as unwed
mothers, and various state interests such as record keeping and
public scrutiny.45
It was not until the 1960s that society began to view confidenti-
ality of adoption records as erroneous and immoral. 46 With the sex-
ual revolution and a change of women's social stature, the social
stigma of illegitimacy began to subside given the rise in single
parenthood from increases in divorce and children born out of wed-
lock.47 Adult adoptees began to assert that they had a constitu-
tional right to know about their origins.48 As a result, this mind-set
soon began to infiltrate into the attitudes of social workers, who
began to keep detailed records of nonidentifying information in-
cluding "nationality, education, health factors, physical characteris-
and biological origins, and mandated the sealing of records and the issuance of
new birth certificates to adoptees.").
42 See Silverman, supra note 34, at 87; see also CARP, supra note 3, at 102.
43 See Silverman, supra note 34, at 87.
44 Lorandos, supra note 2, at 295 ("Facilitating a child's new start in life re-
moved any lingering stigma of illegitimacy on the child, and promoted 'bonding'
with a primary set of parents, guarding the interest of the adopted child."); see also
Silverman, supra note 34, at 87.
45 Lorandos, supra note 2, at 295 (explaining state interests were protected
by "creating a family, providing for orderly transfer and heritability, protecting
parties from public scrutiny, and eliminating additional requirements of record
keeping and maintenance").
46 See Silverman, supra note 34, at 87.
47 See Heidi Hildebrand, Because They Want to Know: An Examination of
the Legal Rights of Adoptees and Their Parents, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J 515, 522-23 (2000)
("Birth mothers became empowered to assert their right to know about the chil-
dren they relinquished and helped give rise to the openness of adoptions."); see
also Silverman, supra note 34, at 87.
48 See Hildebrand, supra note 47, at 523 (challenging the constitutionality of
sealed record laws was organized by the Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association
and the Yesterday's Children and American Adoption Congress).
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tics, occupations, talents, and abilities. '49 A trend for openness in
adoption records began to permeate society.
The growing movement for increased awareness toward the
openness of adoption continued into the mid-1970s. 50 Research
conducted indicated that full disclosure of the adoptee's history of-
fered psychological and practical benefits to both the adoptee and
the adoptive family. 51 "People recognized that providing prospec-
tive adoptive parents with the most complete information available
about children with a special need or who are at risk for medical
problems was essential to ensuring that the family is both emotion-
ally and financially able to cope with the challenges a child might
present. '52 As a result, states soon began to enact legislation al-
lowing adoptive agencies to disclose to adoptive parents the health
and medical history of the adopted child and the adoptee's biologi-
49 Silverman, supra note 34, at 87 (citing Claudine R. Reiss, The Fear of
Opening Pandora's Box: The Need to Restore Birth Parent's Privacy Rights in the
Adoption Process, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 133, 137 (1998)); see also Hildebrand, supra
note 47, at 523 ("More than 35 states passed laws granting automatic access to
nonidentifying information and establishing registry systems for the release of
identifying information.").
50 See CARP, supra note 3, at 167.
5' See Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 703-4. The au-
thor explains:
[Flull disclosure of medical and social background.., can facilitate
appropriate diagnosis and treatment for adopted children at an
early age. Children with psychiatric disorders often receive ineffec-
tive treatment for years, sometimes resulting in being institutional-
ized, because adoptive parents and medical caregivers lack
knowledge that could provide a clue to effective treatment. By the
time the severity of the condition is appreciated it can be too late.
Psychiatrists, who work with psychopathic children, often referred
to as 'unattached children,' say chances of therapy being successful
are greatly increased if the child is diagnosed when young. For chil-
dren over seven, the chances of success are only about 50%, and
for children over eleven, the likelihood of recovery is even lower.
Information regarding substance abuse during pregnancy can facili-
tate diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome or other drug-related
problems. Knowledge of the occurrence of schizophrenia or manic
depression in other biological relatives can hasten appropriate drug
therapy.
52 Blair, Uniform Adoption Act's Health Disclosure Provisions, supra note 6,
at 432.
142 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
cal parents.53 As of today, most states have enacted disclosure stat-
utes in adoption proceedings. 54
II. CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE IN ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
GIVEN THE ADVENT OF GENETIC TESTING
Today, there is no national standard used to record health in-
formation about the adoptee or the adoptee's biological parents.55
The disclosure of an adoptee's health information is rather left for
each state legislature to decide. Adoption statutes do vary in de-
gree on the collection and disclosure of health information of
adoptees as "[s]ome states loosely define the types of information
which must be obtained from birth parents and released to adoptive
parents, while other [states] list with a high degree of specificity the
information that must be available." 56
Typically, state adoption statutes simply refer to the collection
and disclosure of health information that is "known," "available,"
53 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 295.
54 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 295-96 ("Forty-one states have enacted leg-
islation either mandating or allowing the disclosure to adoptive families of an
adopted child's health and genetic history.").
55 See Andrews & Elster, supra note 22, at 131.
56 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (2000) ("Before placing a
child for adoption, the division . . . placing the child . . . shall compile and
provide to the prospective adoptive parents detailed written nonidentifying infor-
mation including a health and genetic history about the birth parents or members
of the birth parent's family....) with ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510(a) (2000)
The state registrar shall.. .release the following information regard-
ing the biological parent named on the original birth certificate of
the adopted person if available from the registrar's adoption
records: (1) the age of the biological parent on the day the adopted
person was born; (2) the heritage of the biological parent, to in-
clude (A) national origin; (B) ethnic background; and (C) tribal
membership; (3) the medical history of the biological parent and of
blood relatives of the biological parent; (4) the number of years of
school completed by the biological parent by the day the adopted
person was born; (5) a physical description of the biological parent
on the day the adopted person was born, including height, weight,
and color of hair, eyes, and skin; (6) the existence of other children
of the biological parent; (7) whether the biological parent was alive
at the time of adoption; (8) the religion of the biological parent;
and (9) other information provided by the biological parent for the
disclosure of the child, which may include such items as photo-
graphs, letters, and a statement explaining the reasons for the
adoption.
See also Lorandos, supra note 2, at 295, 297.
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"obtainable," or "reasonably known. '57 The breakdown of the
adoption laws in the United States is as follows: Thirty- [seven]
states require a compilation of a medical history in the context of
adoption, 58 25 a genetic history or history of hereditary condi-
tions 5 9 and 21 a health history.60 Of the 3[7] states requiring a
57 See generally ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31(d)(5) (2000) ("if known"); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 18.50.510(a) (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.18.510(a) (2000) ("The
state registrar shall... release the following information regarding the biological
parent named on the original birth certificate of the adopted person if available
from the registrar's adoption records..."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-501(8) (2000)
("when obtainable"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (2000) ("[T]he informa-
tion is not otherwise reasonably available."); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506(3) (2000)
("reasonably known or available"); Andrews & Elster, supra note 22, at 131.
58 See generally ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-31(G) (2000); ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.2 3 .18 .510(A) (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8706 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-5-401 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. . § 578-
14 .5(A) (2000); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.4
(West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3.1-2; (West 1994); IowA CODE § 600.8 (2000);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (2000); LA. CHILD CODE ART. 1125(A) (2000); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22 § 8205.1 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-328
(A) (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 210 § 5D(A)(3) (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.954c (2000); MINN. STAT. § 259.79 (1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-
205(1)(A) (2000); Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.121 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. 42-3-101
(2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1(A) (2000);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:15 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-40 (Michie
1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114(1.) (McKinney 1988); OHIO REV. ANN.
§ 3107.12 (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 10 § 57 (1993); OR. REV. STAT
§ 109.342 (1993); 29 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2909 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7.2-1
(Michie 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1740 (Law Co-op. 1993); TEX. CODE ANN.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.032 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (2000);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26-33-350 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-7 (1994); Wis.
STAT. § 48.425 (1993); Wyo. STAT ANN. § 1-22-116 (1994); See also Lori Andrews,
Gen-Etiquette: Genetic Information, Family Relationships, and Adoption, in GE-
NETIC SECRETS, 255, 275 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997).
59 See generally ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-9-505 (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8606 (West 1994); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-5-
302 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (Michie 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-
14.5(A) (2000); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.4
(West 1993); IOWA CODE § 600.8 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (2000); LA.
CHILD CODE ART. 1125(A) (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22 § 8205.1 (West
1995); MINN. STAT. § 259.79 (1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-205(1) (2000); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9 :3-41.1(A) (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-14 (Michie 1994); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 114(1) (McKinney 1988); OHIO REV. ANN. § 3107.12 (West
1994); OR. REV. STAT § 109.342 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7.2-1 (Michie 1993);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1740 (Law Co-op. 1993); TEx. CODE ANN. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. § 16.032 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (2000); WIS. STAT.
§ 48.425 (1993); Wyo. STAT ANN. § 1-22-116 (1994); See also Andrews, supra note
58, at 275.
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compilation of the medical history, 2[9] require information about
both the adoptee and the biological parents,61 six specify compila-
tion of the biological parent(s) medical history,62 one (Colorado)
requires the adoptee's history, and one (Montana) does not specify
whose information is compiled. Of the 25 statutes requiring compi-
lation of a genetic history or history of hereditary diseases, ten re-
quire the information about both the adoptee and the biological
parent(s); 63 13, about the biological. parent(s); 64 and two are not
specific. 65 Of the 21 statutes requiring a compilation of a health
history, 12 require information about the biological parent(s);66
four, about both the adoptee and the biological parents;67 three,
about the adoptee 68 and one (New Mexico) is not specific. 69
60 See generally ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31 (2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
129 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4 5A-746
(2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (Michie 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520
(2000); MINN. STAT. § 259.79 (1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:15 (2000);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-14 (Michie 1994);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114(1) (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-25; (2000);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-01 (Michie 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7.2-1 (Michie
1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1740 (Law Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-6-15.2 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-141 (2000); TEX. CODE ANN.
CiV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.032 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (2000);
VT. STAT. ANN, TIT. 4, § 436 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.350 (West 1994);
See also Andrews, supra note 58, at 275.
61 Alabama, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming; See also Andrews, supra note 58 at 276.
62 Alaska, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, and Ohio; See also An-
drews, supra note 58 at 276.
63 California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming; See also Andrews, supra note 58 at 276.
64 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah; See also An-
drews, supra note 58 at 276.
65 Iowa and New Mexico; See also Andrews, supra note 58 at 276.
66 Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washing-
ton; See also Andrews, supra note 58 at 276.
67 Alabama, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Texas; See also Andrews, supra
note 58 at 276.
68 Arkansas, Rhode Island, and Utah; See also Andrews, supra note 58 at
276.
69 Andrews, supra note 58, at 259-60.
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Twenty-three states require this information be disclosed to the
adoptive parents before or soon after the finalization of the
adoption.70
Even with the passage of disclosure statutes in adoption pro-
ceedings, information about the adoptive child is still not being re-
vealed to adoptive parents although readily available. 71 There are
three main reasons for this. First, many adoption agencies still hold
a belief that the adoptee will be stigmatized by the information re-
vealed and that, in general, adoptive parents are better off not
knowing any information. 72 Second, disclosure statutes are them-
selves defective in that they do not specify a "bright-line" standard
of care when adoption agencies disclose the adoptee's health infor-
mation. 73 Given the vague wording of most adoption statutes,
adoption agencies usually reveal information at their own discre-
tion.74 Third, adoption agencies are not penalized by statute when
they fail to disclose this information.75
Given the inadequacies of states' disclosure statutes, adoptive
parents are realizing the disclosure statutes mandated by states are
not detailed or accurate enough to provide a reasonably sufficient
medical history. "Although attempted adoption revocations are
rare, they have increased as adoptive parents felt defrauded, be-
trayed, and helpless to meet the unexpected emotional and finan-
cial demands of their child's sickness or disorder that was not
disclosed to them during the adoption process. '76 Despite efforts
70 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming; See also Andrews, supra note 58 at 276.
71 See Hard to Place Children, supra note 40. As the author notes:
Many caseworkers feel that negative information hampers place-
ment by stigmatizing the adoptee in the eyes of prospective par-
ents. Also, there is a fear that the information will harm the child's
self-image or cause anxiety about potentially developing an illness
or disorder. Others feel that disclosing background information fa-
cilitates tracing of the birth parents and risks invasion of the birth
family's privacy.
72 See Hard to Place Children, supra note 40.
73 See Hard to Place Children, supra note 40 (explaining how most adoption
statutes contain ambiguous standards in revealing medical information about the
adoptee such as "if available" or "where practicable").
74 See Hard to Place Children, supra note 40.
75 See Hard to Place Children, supra note 40.
76 Blair, Uniform Adoption Act's Health Disclosure Provisions, supra note 6,
at 435; See also Hard to Place Children, supra note 40 (defining "wrongful adop-
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to amend adoption laws in the 1980s for providing better disclosure
laws on health-related information about the adoptee during the
adoption process, inadequate disclosure of this vital information
still remains a huge problem. 77
Unfortunately, this problem has not subsided in recent years78
given highly publicized cases eliciting the continuous problem of
defective disclosure laws. For example, in 1999, Jeremy Stroh-
meyer, a teenager, was convicted of raping and murdering seven-
year-old Sherrice Iverson in a Nevada casino restroom.79 Jeremy
was apprehended after he was seen on a videotape walking into the
bathroom with the little girl and then leaving the bathroom a while
later without her.80 On CBS This Morning, on October 21, 1999,
his parents, in an interview, claimed they were lied to when they
tion [as] a tort action, based in fraud or negligence, which allows adoptive parents
to recover for intentional or negligent misrepresentations made by an adoption
agency regarding their adopted child's physical or mental health history or genetic
background." In 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized this new tort in Burr v.
Board of County Commissioners, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986)].). Since this case,
other states have followed Ohio's lead and have allowed for the tort of wrongful
adoption, grounded in intentional concealment, or intentional or negligent misrep-
resentation. They include Arizona, Taeger v. Catholic Family and Community Ser-
vices, 995 P.2d 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); California, Michael J. v. Los Angeles
County Dept. of Adoptions, 201 C.A.33d 859 (1988); Florida, Ambrose v. Catholic
Social Services, 736 So.2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Roe v. Catholic Charities
of the Diocese of Springfield, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Il. 1992); Louisiana, April v. Asso-
ciated Catholic Charities of New Orleans, 629 So.2d 1295 (La. 1993); Maine,
MacMath v. Maine Adoption Placement Services, 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993); Mas-
sachusetts, Mohr v. Com., 653 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1995); Mississippi, Foster v.
Bass, 575 So.2d 967 (Miss. 1990); Montana, Jackson v. State, 956 P.2d 35 (Mont.
1998); New York, Juman v. Louise Wise Services, 620 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1st Dept.
1995); Pennsylvania, Gibbs v. Ernst 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994); Rhode Island, Mal-
lette v. Children's Friend and Service, 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995); Washington, Mc-
Kinney v. State, 950 P.2d 461 (Wash. 1998);Wisconsin, Meracle v. Children's
Service Society of Wisconsin, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989); and West Virginia, Wol-
ford v. Children's Home Society of West Virginia, 17 F.Supp.2d 577 (S.D.W.Va.
1998).
77 See Blair, Uniform Adoption Act's Health Disclosure Provisions, supra
note 6, at 435-36; See also Lorandos, supra note 2, at 296.
78 See Hard to Place Children, supra note 40.
79 See Strohmeyer's Parents File Claim, L. V. REV., (Oct. 16, 1999) (stating
Jeremy Strohmeyer received life imprisonment without the possibility of parole),
available at 1999 WL 9295509.
80 See id.
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adopted Jeremy.81 They stated they were never told when they
adopted Jeremy that his birth mother suffered from schizophrenia,
which they believed played a part into this horrible tragedy. 82 They
strongly felt that this murder would have been prevented had they
known of this information when adopting Jeremy so they could
have been on the lookout for signs of schizophrenia 83 since behav-
ioral geneticists have recently discovered the inheritability of schiz-
ophrenia.84 During the adoption process, the Strohymeyers
specifically told the adoption agency they did not want to adopt a
81 See CBS News: This Morning (CBS television broadcast, October 21,
1999) (interviewing John and Winnie Strohmeyer, Parents of Jeremy Strohmeyer).
The transcript reads:
Mitchell (interviewer): Mrs. Strohmeyer... why are you suing the
county?
W. Strohmeyer (mother): . . . I would say four or five weeks ago
when we went through the adoption files, we discovered that the
county had premeditatedly and intently not disclosed to us that our
son's biological mother was diagnosed schizophrenic, and in fact
had been hospitalized over 60 times in state mental hospitals prior
to our adopting Jeremy.
See also Strohmeyer's Parents File Claim, supra note 79. As described by the
reporter:
The Strohmeyers signed up with the county to adopt a child in
1974. . .When they met with the county case workers, they told
them they would consider adopting a child whose mother had
taken drugs... But, they specifically told them they did not want a
child with a family history of mental illness ... [Tihe county placed
a baby then known as Jeremy Halkl with them in 1980, even though
Jeremy's mother was a schizophrenic.
82 See CBS News: This Morning, supra note 81.
83 See CBS News: This Morning, supra note 81. The transcript of the inter-
view reads as follows:
Mitchell (interviewer): Do you think had you known this informa-
tion, that the murder could have been prevented?
J. Strohmeyer (father): Absolutely. You know, if you look back re-
ally quickly when you bring up your own children that are biologi-
cal to you ... the tool box or the tools that you have is really your
past, your parents past, your relatives... You go through a ques-
tion and answer process that normally stretches back way beyond
your own personal understanding of who you are, but your rela-
tives. There is a chain of understanding that you have. With Jeremy
or any adopted child that chain of information or those tools really
need to be given to you, else you really have no basis of under-
standing to go by in that regard.
84 See Holland, supra note 24, at 289-90 (quoting MARGARET W. THOMPSON
et. al., GENETICS IN MEDICINE (5th ed. 1991)).
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child with a known history of mental disease.85 Thus, in response to
the pain and anguish caused by this terrible tragedy, the
Strohmeyers have filed suit against the adoption agency for failure
to disclose this information to them during the adoption process.86
Jeremy's parents are just one example of adoptive parents who
have realized the inadequacies of adoption laws, particularly in the
disclosure the adoptee's medical and health history.
Realizing the inadequacies of disclosure laws, prospective
adoptive parents have begun turning to science rather than the law
in order to combat this problem. This "science" is the result of a
joint project between the Department of Energy and the U.S. Na-
tional Institute of Health to describe all human genetic material
known as DNA. 87 Termed the Human Genome Project, the basic
goal of the Human Genome Project is to map and sequence the 24
different human chromosomes, which comprise the human gen-
85 See Strohmeyer's Parents File Claim, supra note 79.
86 See CBS News: This Morning, supra note 81. The transcript of the inter-
view reads as follows:
Mitchell (interviewer): 'What do you hope to accomplish by this
lawsuit?'
Gregory W. Smith (attorney for the Strohmeyers): 'What the
Strohmeyers hope to accomplish.. .is they want to really shake up
the system. They want to ensure that any parents that adopt chil-
dren in the future will have access to medical records so that the
parents can prepare and do what's necessary to make sure these
children grow up well adjusted.
87 See Denise K. Casey, Genes, Dreams, and Reality: The Promises and Risks
of the New Genetics, 83 JUDICATURE: GENES & JUSTICE, THE GROWING IMPACT
OF THE NEW GENETICS ON THE COURTS 105, 106 (1999); see also, Daniel Drell &
Ari Patrinos, Introducing the Human Genome Project: Its Relevance, Triumphs and
Challenges, 36 THE JUDGE'S J. 5, 6 (1997). As the author explains:
HGP is an attempt to map completely the entire spectrum of ge-
netic materials that can be found in all human beings . . . [It] will
determine the complete sequence of the DNA from a typical
human cell and will provide information and resources to under-
stand some of the critical differences that make us individuals and
that often contribute to diseases.
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ome. 88 Rapid technological advancements have enabled the first
phase of completion of the project in the year 2000.89
Since most diseases have a genetic basis,90 the mapping and
sequencing of the genes that make up the human genome have
caused scientists to determine the presence and absence of both
normal and abnormal genes that can cause an inherited disorder.91
As a result, researchers have developed extensive genetic tests to
test for a variety of genetic disorders, predicting whether an individ-
ual has a disorder or may later develop a disorder by examining
that person's genetic makeup.92 To date, scientists have developed
genetic tests for hundreds of genetic disorders. 93 Tests for untreat-
able, late-onset diseases include alphal-antitrypsin deficiency, 94 cys-
tic fibrosis, Huntington's disease, Duchenne's muscular dystrophy,
Lou Gehrig's disease, Alzheimer's disease, and certain cancers such
as Li-Fraumeni syndrome. 95
88 See Leroy Hood & Lee Rowen, Genes, Genomes, and Society, in GENETIC
SECRETS, 3, 8 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997); see also Casey, supra note 87, at 109.
The author explains:
Some 4000 rare diseases are due to a single mutation in a single
gene. These include cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, and Tay
Sachs. The causes are more complex for common disorders such as
heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, cancers, Alzheimer's disease,
schizophrenia, and manic depression. These diseases are thought
to be due to a variety of gene mutations, perhaps acting in concert,
or to a combination of genes and such environmental factors as diet
or exposure to radiation or toxins.
89 See Drell, supra note 11, at 7 (explaining that during the first phase of the
Human Genome Project, a draft of an entire strand of human DNA, was
completed).
90 See Casey, supra note 87, at 109 ("[One] inherit[s] a particular condition,
such as lung disease cystic fibrosis, or an increased likelihood for developing such
disorders as heart disease or colon cancer. [One] also inherit[s] the particular abil-
ity to respond to such environmental Stresses as viruses, bacteria, and toxins.").
91 See Holland, supra note 24, at 323.
92 See Holland, supra note 24, at 323.
93 See Holland, supra note 24, at 323 (explaining genetic tests may now be
preformed to determine a person's predisposition for sickle cell anemia, Tay-Sachs
disease, Huntington's disease, Alzheimer's disease, Lou Gehrig's disease, cystic fi-
brosis, muscular dystrophy as well as colon, ovarian, pancreatic, and other
cancers).
94 See Hoffman & Wulfsberg, supra note 13, at 332 ("Alpha1 -antitrypsin de-
ficiency is a genetic enzyme deficiency, common in individuals of Scandinavian
ancestry, that results in a high risk of adult-onset emphysema in 80 percent of
individuals with sever enzyme deficiency.").
95 See Hoffman & Wulfsberg, supra note 13, at 332-33.
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In response to the Human Genome Project, many prospective
adoptive parents have now begun to request genetic testing on pro-
spective adoptees based on the cost of performing genetic tests96
and that important health-related information can be revealed. 97 As
of today, genetic testing is allowed to either compensate for inaccu-
rate medical records or for what prospective adoptive parents feel
are inadequate medical records on the adoptee. 98 Many adoption
agencies welcome these genetic tests in hopes it will promote more
adoptions and reduce wrongful adoption suits caused by a lack of
medical information supplied at the time of adoption. 99 At this
point though, both the prospective adoptive parents and the adop-
tion agency's interests are satisfied, but one may ask what is the
child's best interest in having a genetic test to determine the child's
predisposition for an untreatable, adult-onset genetic disease?
Surprisingly, no state has reacted to this development by re-
quiring an adoptee to actually undergo genetic testing 00 for un-
treatable, adult-onset diseases either by the adoption agency or by
prospective adoptive parents.10 1 Current adoption statutes only ad-
dress the issue of genetic technology by calling for the collection
96 See Lisa M. Krieger, Genetic Testing Leaps Ahead of Social Implications,
MERCURY NEWS, (July 3, 2001) available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/
news/depth/gene070301.html (explaining the costs of commercially manufactured
tests can range from $100 to $2000 depending on what genetic tests are sought).
97 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 297.
98 See Janet Farrell Smith, Reasons Against Pre-Adoptive Genetic Testing of
Children, at http://health.upenn.edu/-bioethic/genetics/articles/.3.smith.adoptive.
genetics.html (visited Sept. 11, 2000).
99 See id.
100 See Andrews, supra note 69, at 260.
101 See Andrews & Elster, supra note 22, at 133. Andrews and Elster explain:
There are no statutes which explicitly state that an agency has af-
firmative duty to test a child as a way to collect genetic information.
This is illustrated by Foster v. Bass, 575 So.2d 967 (Miss. 1990),
which exemplified the courts' reluctance to find such a duty owed
by adoption agencies. In this case, the adoption agency gave the
adoptive parents a medical form that provided information about
the adoptee. On the form was a space for a test for
phenylketornuria ("PKU"). When the adoptive parents' physician
examined the child he noticed the space for PKU was blank, but
believed the results of the test were taken by the adoption agency
and not received yet. The child did have PKU and since it was left
unnoticed, suffered severe retardation as a result. At the time of
this event even though the test was not required by statute, the test
was available given its requirement by hospitals and the space on
the form for it. The court found that the agency was under no duty
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and retention of genetic information such Hawaii's adoption stat-
ute, which states:
The department of health shall prepare a standard
form... for the purpose of perpetuating medical infor-
mation relating to the adopted child's potential genetic
or other inheritable diseases or afflictions, including
but not limited to known genetic disorders, inheritable
diseases, and similar medical histories, if known, of the
parents of the natural parents.10 2
Currently, no state statute allows or prohibits a third party to
genetically test an adoptee, in order to determine the child's predis-
position to an untreatable, adult-onset disorder. Since a child's in-
terest should be first and foremost in adoption proceedings,
genetically testing a child for an untreatable, adult-onset disease
does nothing except serve the interests of the prospective adoptive
parents and adoption agencies. 10 3 States should first and foremost
look out for the adoptee's interests, since the prospective adoptive
parents are not yet the adoptee's legal guardians. They have no
parental rights before the child is adopted. Therefore, an argument
can be made that if a statute allowed for this type of testing, the
statute would be rendered unconstitutional because it not only vio-
lates public policy, but the privacy interests of the child.104
III. THE ADOPTEE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRIVACY
FORBIDS GENETIC TESTING ON THE ADOPTEE
Courts have recognized that the right to privacy, even though
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, is a fundamental
constitutional guarantee for every individual, including minors. 10 5
Courts have extended the fundamental right to privacy to include
to conduct a test of PKU even though the adoption agency created
the medical form.
102 HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5(a) (2000).
103 See N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 360 (Colo. 2000); See also Witso v.
Overby, 609 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Minn. 2000); see also Crago v. Kinzie 733 N.E.2d
1219, 1225 (Ohio 2000); See also Tyrone W. v. Danielle R., 741 A.2d 553, 572 (Md.
1999).
104 See Carol Isaacson Barash, Genetic Testing in Children and Adolescents:
Parental Authority, The Rights of Children, and The Duty of Geneticists, 3 U. CHI.
L. SCH. RT. 545, 551 (1996).
105 See Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 687; see also
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Court writes:
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personal matters such as marriage, procreation, contraception, fa-
milial relationships, abortion, personal possession of obscene mate-
rial, child rearing, and education. 10 6
Whether from a theoretical or a practical perspective, there is
not one precise definition of the right to privacy. 10 7 The Supreme
Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird described the constitutional right to
privacy as the right to be free from "unwanted and unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters fundamentally affecting a per-
son,"' 08 but accordingly has stated the "concept of a constitutional
right of privacy remains largely undefined." 10 9 Even with privacy
evading definition, the Court under Whalen v. Roe has established
two distinct types of privacy interests.110 The first is the "interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" and
the second is the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters."''
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the lib-
erty thus guaranteed [by the 1 4 th Amendment], . . . [w]ithout a
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but
also the right of the individual to ... engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children.., and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the order pur-
suit of happiness.
See also Palko v. Connecticut 319, 325 (1937) (determining personal rights implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty are included in the guarantee of personal pri-
vacy); see also Lorandos, supra note 2, at 314; see also Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 52-75 (1976) (discussing the consent provision that must be
signed by a parent in order for a minor to receive an abortion); See, e.g., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(procreation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abor-
tion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (obscene material); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child rearing); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (child rearing and family).
107 See Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 688.
108 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
109 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (holding a New York statute was
constitutional where patients' names and addresses where placed in a centralized
computer data bank for having a prescription of dangerous drugs that have both a
legitimate and illegitimate use).
110 See id. at 599.
111 Id. at 599-600.
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A. The Adoptee Should be the Sole Decisionmaker in Whether to
Undergo Genetic Testing or Not
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court employed substantive due
process into the realm of personal activities.112 The Court noted,
"[L]iberty guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but
also the right•.. to engage in any of the common occupations of life
... and generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized by the
common law as essential to the pursuit of happiness by free
men." 113 Thus, over the years, the Court, in order to determine
whether a right to privacy has been violated under substantive due
process of the Fourteenth Amendment, must recognize first
whether a right is fundamental. 114 Once this is established, the
Court must balance the fundamental right against state considera-
tions using a strict scrutiny standard in order to decide if the gov-
ernment's interference is justified by an overriding purpose.115
For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court held an
Oklahoma statute unconstitutional that allowed courts to sterilize
habitual criminals who had been convicted two or more times of
felonies involving moral turpitude.116 The Court determined these
sterilized persons to have "forever [been] deprived of a basic lib-
erty. ' '1 7 Using strict scrutiny, the Oklahoma statute offended "the
basic civil rights of man," where procreation, rooted in tradition, is
112 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (determining a Nebraska law, which prohibited
the teaching of any subjects in any language other than the English language, in
any school, was unconstitutional).
113 Id.
114 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (determining procreation is fundamental to
the very existence and survival of race thus, a fundamental right); see also Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 486 ("[Marriage is] an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony of living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects."); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness. [It] is one of the basic civil rights of man.").
115 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 ("Strict scrutiny of the classification which a
State makes in a sterilization law is essential."); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 11
(applying a strict scrutiny standard to racial classifications for marriage in the state
of Virginia); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 ("Where 'fundamental rights' are in-
volved, the court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest.' ").
116 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543.
117 See id. at 541.
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVII
a fundamental right.118 The sterilization law if upheld, would have
"irreparable injury" with "far-reaching and devastating effects." 119
The Court concluded the right to procreate was a fundamental right
and there was no compelling government interest that could forego
this basic liberty. 120
Similarly in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held a married
couple had a fundamental right to buy and use contraceptives in the
privacy of their home. 21 The Court stated marriage was an "area
of protected freedoms. ' 122 To prevent married couples from using
contraceptives would result in a destructive impact on the sanctity
of marriage. 123 Loving v. Virginia expanded this notion stating
marriage is "essential to the pursuit of happiness by [all] free
men."'1 24 In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court described marriage as
"fundamental to the very existence of race."'1 25 Therefore, by legis-
lating in this area, the government intruded on a traditionally inti-
mate area of life. Within seven years, the Court extended this
privacy interest to unmarried persons. 126 The Court went on to in-
validate a New York law prohibiting the distribution of contracep-
tives, especially to minors, by any person who was not a licensed
physician. 127
The most prominent right to privacy case is Roe v. Wade where
the Court held a woman's right to privacy was broad enough to
cover a woman's right to choose to have an abortion before viabil-
ity.128 The Court determined the right for a woman to choose to
undergo an abortion is a fundamental right, given the severe bur-
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See id. at 543.
121 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
122 Id. at 485.
123 See id.
124 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (declaring that the Virginia miscegenation statute
which prevented marriage solely on the basis of race violated equal protection and
due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
125 Boddie, 401 U.S. at 384 (declaring unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute,
which provided that any person having minor issue in the state of Wisconsin who is
not in his or her custody is under obligation to support by a court order or judg-
ment that does not allow the minor to marry).
126 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
127 See Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) ("[T]he Consti-
tution protects individuals in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion
from the state. Restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives clearly burden
the freedom to make such decisions.").
128 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
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den a woman would have if she were forced to carry a child to
term.129 The state's interest of protecting the health of the mother
and the fetus did not weigh in favor of a compelling interest for the
state to regulate abortion under a strict scrutiny 130 standard.131
Just as procreation, marriage, contraception, abortion, chil-
drearing, and education are included under an umbrella of personal
privacy rights protected by the Constitution, an adoptee's genetic
makeup should also fall under this umbrella of privacy interests.132
Testing an adoptee for future risk of untreatable, adult-onset dis-
eases, before he or she is adopted, infringes on his or her funda-
mental right to privacy. This situation is just another example of
how a third party "fundamentally affect[s] a person['s privacy inter-
est],"1133 since DNA holds deeply personal information relating to
the biological identity of the individual. In balancing the interests
of the parties involved in the adoption proceeding - the child, the
state, the adoption agency, and the prospective adoptive parents -
not only does a fundamental right exist, but also no compelling
state interest could justify performance of the genetic test on the
child.
Some scholars conclude that there is a benefit in having an
adoptee undergo a genetic test to see if the child has a predisposi-
129 See id. at 153. The Court stated:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by childcare. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bring a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. . The addi-
tional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may
be involved.
130 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the plurality had
reaffirmed the decision of Roe v. Wade that a woman has the right to choose
whether to have an abortion, but replaced the strict scrutiny test with an "undue
burden" test. The new "undue burden test" allowed government regulations of
abortions prior to viability unless there was an "undue burden" on a woman's ac-
cess to have the abortion. This is the only exception given to the strict scrutiny test
in dealing with fundamental rights. Therefore, for this argument, the strict scrutiny
test will still be applied.
131 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156.
132 Where the courts in Skinner, Roe, Griswold, Eisenstadt, Loving, Boddie,
and Carrie held there was a fundamental right present, a child's right to be free
from genetic testing (in the context for an untreatable, adult-onset disease) is no
different from these cases.
133 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54.
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tion for an untreatable, adult-onset disorder, but this benefit is not
strong enough to induce a violation of an adoptee's right to pri-
vacy.' 34 Just as sterilizing a person can cause "far-reaching and dev-
astating effects,"'135 genetically testing the adoptee for adult-onset
diseases, creates irreparable injury psychologically, personally, and
socially. 36 For example, performing these genetic tests will most
likely result in the child exhibiting a poor self-image, if it emerges
that he or she has a defect in his or her genome, since the child will
feel "different" from others. 137 Basically, these children will suffer
prematurely the emotional and mental aspects of the disease they
might develop as adults, infecting almost every aspect of the child's
life.138 The child, as he or she grows older, will experience feelings
of inadequacy, possibly develop a fear of relationships due to his or
her "predestined future," and may believe he or she is "unmar-
134 For scholars' arguments in favor of performing genetic tests on adoptee's
for untreatable late-onset disorders, see infra notes 170-173 and accompanying
text.
135 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
136 See Mark A. Rothstein, The Use Of Genetic Information for Nonmedical
Purposes, 9 J.L. & HEALTH, 109, 118 (1994-5).
137 See Holland, supra note 24, at 339; see also ASHG/ACMG Report, supra
note 12 (demonstrating the reason a child may suffer from low self-esteem. This is
because he or she knows that "something" is wrong with him or her when he or
she is consistently passed up in adoptions. Also when they learn of the test results,
he or she may feel he or she has lost his or her sense of privacy. Also, children's
understanding of illness is often limited and they may foster self-blame for their
disease.).
138 See Holland, supra note 24, at 339; see also Pelias & Rothstein, supra note
14, (demonstrating these tests affect every aspect of a child in life including family
bonds, school, and friendships since these children know their life will be cut short
at some point in the future).
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riageable."'1 39 Thus, these genetic tests pose a barrier to a happy
and healthy life, now and in the future.140
Furthermore, a child might psychologically suffer from what
one medical ethicist termed "unpatient syndrome. ' 141 This syn-
drome causes the child to be physically and mentally well on the
outside, but on the inside the child develops a severe anxiety based
on his or her knowledge of the untold future as a result of the ge-
netic test.142 In many instances, the child may visit doctors fre-
quently, just to seek monitoring, reassurance, and comfort. 143 In
more extreme cases, a child might even contemplate suicide. 144
Stigmatization is another harmful effect that could result from
genetically testing the adoptee.145 Based on the results of a genetic
test, an adoptee will most likely be grouped into a class based on an
139 Holland, supra note 24, at 339 (demonstrating that when the adoptee
reaches adulthood:
The adoptee, now an adult can work for years before a disorder
manifests, [but] psychological problems may arise . . . because a
future prohibition from work tends to cause negative feelings about
oneself. Work-related evaluations carry over into other aspects of
life, so that a person deemed unfit to work is often regarded as
unfit or inadequate as a person. The fact that these genetic tests]
refer only to potential future disabilities does not reduce the broad
negative implications of such designations.).
140 See Holland, supra note 24, at 339; See also Pelias & Rothstein, supra note
14 (demonstrating these tests affect every aspect of a child later on in life such as
"employment, reproductive choices, and marriage").
141 See Holland, supra note 24, at 339.
142 See Holland, supra note 24, at 338.
143 See Holland, supra note 24, at 338-39.
144 See Holland, supra note 24, at 339 (explaining how "one medical ethicist
that has termed this disease the " 'unpatient syndrome' " and has stated that he has
begun to see symptoms arising from people who have found out they will develop
Huntington's disease. Many genetic counselors now are concerned about the po-
tential suicides that could result from a genetic test, since the "grief and loss of
hope may be overwhelming." Therefore, with these harmful effects, genetic test-
ing is not a benefit for minors.); See also Philip R. Reilly, Public Policy and Legal
Issues Raised by Advances in Genetic Screening and Testing, 27 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 1327, 1340 (1993). The author explains that:
[C]enters have refused to test at risk children under the age of eigh-
teen for the [Huntington's disease] gene. This policy is that the po-
tential harms of testing in that age group are greater than the
benefits.... Persons who learn they are carriers are also at risk for
severe depression, and it is known that among carriers the suicide
rate is four-fold, higher than the general population.
145 See ASHG/ACMG Report, supra note 12.
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adoptee's genetic makeup.146 When the child's genetic predisposi-
tion is uncovered, prospective adoptive parents may not choose to
adopt the child based on the classification. 147 Genetic tests reduce
the chance the child will ever be adopted. 148 Even if the parents
choose to adopt the child, they might treat him differently because
the child's future is preordained.149
Basically, genetic testing allows prospective adoptive parents
to strive for the perfect child.150 In today's world, a child with no
risk of health problems in the future is a better child financially,
emotionally, and physically, than a child who will fall prey to illness
and suffer.15' Thus, this idea creates a certain class of children -
the "perfect, healthy children.' 1 52 The Meyer Court addressed a
similar issue where the Court felt a Nebraska law that required edu-
cating children only in English was trying to "foster a homogenous
people.' 53 Similarly in adoptions, prospective adoptive parents, by
testing adoptees for genetic diseases, are trying to seek a homoge-
neous class of healthy children, discarding "defective children."
The Court in Meyer said Nebraska's motive in creating this law was
unconstitutional. 54 The situation of selectively choosing to adopt a
child based on the child's genetic makeup is no different.
146 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
147 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14 (demonstrating how adoptive par-
ents embark on the quest for the perfect baby. "No child brings a guarantee of
perfection. Requiring more of adopted newborns and children than of biologically
related newborns and children turns adopted newborns and children into
commodities.").
148 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
149 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14 (explaining some times when the
child is known to have a predisposition to a genetic disorder the expectations of
the child are lowered in the family); see also ASHG/ACMG Report, supra note 12
(explaining how parents may feel guilty about having the child tested, which many
times lead to overindulgence and protectiveness. "This 'vulnerable child' syndrome
occurs when the perception of a serious illness causes parents to become overpro-
tective and to restrict a child's participation in childhood activities." Or the exact
opposite may occur where the parents might reject the child or treat the child as a
scapegoat.); see also Holland, supra note 24, at 341 ("Parents may spend less re-
sources on the afflicted child because they may not want to waste time, money,
counseling, love, etc., on a child who will not be able to utilize the resources.").
150 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
151 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
152 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
153 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
154 See id.
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Furthermore, to allow prospective adoptive parents to test an
adoptive child for genetic diseases turns the child into a commodity,
creating an underclass of potential adoptees.155 This runs contrary
to public policy, which is to promote the best interest of the child,
the basis of the current legal standard in adoption proceedings. 156
Genetic tests themselves result "only in probabilities, [and] not
in certainties."' 157 A genetic test can "only provide for a range of
risk.' 1 58 Many people do not understand this aspect of genetic
tests, especially children. Therefore, there is more of a probability
of harming the adoptee's future unnecessarily by misinterpreting
the results of a genetic test.159 It has been argued that adequate
genetic counseling may combat this problem.160 The task of genetic
counseling is to provide information to individuals who seek infor-
mation about the genetic disorder.161 More specifically, the genetic
counselor will not only discuss the genetic test, but can coordinate
the testing, help interpret tests results, educate the person about the
disease and how the disease runs in the family, and most impor-
tantly, help that person understand the risk of a genetic condition, if
it is present in their genetic makeup. 162 Though, due to the massive
155 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
156 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14; see also N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d at
360; see also Witso, 609 N.W.2d at 620; see also Crago, 733 N.E.2d at 1225; see also
Tyrone W., 741 A.2d at, 572.
157 Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
158 Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
159 See Holland, supra note 24, at 342. The author explains:
[I]n the early 1970s, lawmakers required genetic testing for sickle
cell anemia. The sickle cell anemia testing led to disastrous results
because too few funds were devoted to education and counseling to
help people understand the information they received. Many who
took the test were diagnosed as carriers of the disorder. This cre-
ated confusion and anxiety because people did not understand that
being a carrier did not mean they suffered from the disease. Dur-
ing another screening, an eighteen year old woman was 'psycholog-
ically traumatized' when she was diagnosed as a carrier of Tay-
Sachs, partly because she was not sufficiently counseled about the
meaning of the test, nor was she provided with information about
the results.
160 See THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOION 2 (Angus Clarke ed., 1994) (intro-
duction to the collection of articles).
161 See id.
162 See Amy Adams, What is Genetic Counseling?, at http://
www.genetichealth.com/Resources-What-IsGeneticCounseling.shtml, (last up-
dated Sept. 27, 2000) (explaining further how genetic counselors are part of an
integrate health care team which includes social workers, nurses, and medical ge-
160 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [VoL. XVIII
increase in advances and use of genetic testing, there are simply not
enough counselors available to meet with every family that receives
a set of test results and discuss the results with them.163 Given the
lack of genetic counselors in the field, it is more likely prospective
adoptive parents will misinterpret the results of a genetic test harm-
ing the adoptee's chance of adoption now and in the future.
Finally, as with a woman's right to choose in Roe, a "child's
future autonomy interests ground the child's ability to decide for
him or herself to what extent he or she wishes to obtain knowledge
of his or her genetic profile." 164 "Decisions by adults to test chil-
dren preclude a child's 'open future.' ",165 The child not only has no
choice in the matter in whether to perform the genetic test or not,
but the results of the genetic test become part of the child's general
medical record. 166 Basically, the test forecloses an adoptee's free-
dom to make decisions in the future as an adult 167 since every time
an employer, insurer, educator, or physician requests the child's
medical record, the genetic tests will be part of the medical record
and must be revealed to the third party.1 68 In many cases, this in-
formation could lead to vast discrimination in the future with re-
gards to employment and insurance coverage. 169
neticists to help families make "informed decisions" about their health. Further-
more, many genetic counselors are seen to many as "patient advocates, helping
people receive the support and services that they need").
163 See Holland, supra note 24, at 343.
164 Smith, supra note 98; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("Maternity may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. [This factor, as well as mental and
physical conditions led to the holding that having the right to choice is a funda-
mental right protected by the Constitution.]").
165 See Smith, supra note 98.
166 See Holland, supra note 24, at 347.
167 See Barash, supra note 104, at 549.
168 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
169 See Holland, supra note 24, at 344-48. The author explains:
For example, one man was rejected for life insurance because he
had Charcot-Marie-Tooth Disease. Also, an eight year old child
who underwent genetic testing was revealed to have Fragile X syn-
drome, a genetic disorder that impairs mental development. This
cost the family its health insurance, and four other insurance com-
panies denied family coverage. [In the area of employment, many
companies who hire an individual with a predisposition to a genetic
disorder may] spend less on health insurance plans and less sick
days would be used [saving] the company money .... [I]n the long
run, the company would not have to expend resources to train new
employees after the sick employees leave. Thus, applicants who
have a clean bill of heath and submit this on their job application
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The compelling state interest in allowing adoption agencies or
prospective adoptive parents to perform these genetic tests on
adoptees is futile. One possible state interest is to prevent possible
financial and emotional strain on the family later on in life.170 Sec-
ond, adoptive parents may feel they are entitled to full disclosure of
a child's medical background being that they will be responsible for
the child for the rest of the child's life.171 Third, adoption agencies
welcome genetic testing since it will avoid liability by the adoption
agency for wrongful adoptions caused by lack of medical informa-
tion disclosed to the adoptive parents during the adoption
process. 172
One last argument the state may advance is genetically testing
an adoptee for an untreatable, adult-onset disease is no different
from statutes, which permit genetic testing in paternity disputes. 73
Most likely, the state's compelling interest in allowing the results of
a genetic test to determine paternity is that it is in the child's best
interest to know who the child's father is. Thus, the state would
most likely argue that in this situation, the genetic tests are similarly
determining a child's heritage, with an added benefit of informing
the child of vital medical information.
All four arguments fail. The arguments fail because the severe
burden placed on the adoptive child overrides all other interests. 174
"Children do not come with guarantees. ' 175 Understandably, it is
important that parents should be disclosed of known illnesses of
their children, but prospective adoptive parents do not have paren-
tal rights over the adoptee yet and predictive genetic testing goes
beyond the standard of disclosure laws and into an area of personal
would have a better advantage than those who do not wish to in-
clude such information on applications.
170 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14 (explaining how a family may not
have the financial ability to monitor the child's health and seek appropriate treat-
ment as the child gets older. Also, the emotional effects of having to lose a child to
a genetic disorder are overwhelming to most individuals.); see also supra note 8.
171 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
172 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
173 See generally COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 5-
1029,1038 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 257.55 (1990).
174 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14 (explaining the best interest of the
child forms the basic legal standard in adoption proceedings and given the burden
of a performing genetic test on the adoptee is severe, genetically testing an
adoptee completely contradicts the goal of adoption).
175 Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
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privacy. 176 DNA is a biological fingerprint, "an information mole-
cule that carries instructions, [biologically] for creating and main-
taining life."' 177 Basically, each strand of DNA holds the key to a
person's traits and future well being. No two DNA strands are
alike 178 making DNA deeply personal and intimate in nature. 179
Thus, genetic makeup, as the Skinner Court said of procreation, is
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"180 and
no one has the authority to test an individual without the individ-
ual's consent. Furthermore, these genetic tests are unnecessary be-
cause there is no clear benefit in knowing the potential for a disease
since no action can be taken to prevent the disease when the adop-
tive parents find out.181
Furthermore, even though states have established that a ge-
netic test may be used to determine paternity, this rule is only a
presumption and not conclusive. 182 Others states have concluded
that it is within the discretion of the court to permit genetic test-
ing.183 Most states have agreed though, that in order to allow the
results of a genetic test in order to determine paternity, courts
should consider surrounding factors, policy, and logic in conjunc-
tion with the standard of adoption proceedings, the best interest of
the child.184 As previously discussed, in considering policy and
logic, it is clear the adoptee's interest outweigh any compelling in-
terest by the state.
Finally, as the interests between adoptees and the state are
weighed in determining whether to allow prospective adoptive par-
ents to genetically test adoptees, the disadvantages of testing over-
rides any compelling interest by the state. Genetic testing is an
infringement on the child's right to privacy and future autonomy as
an adult. 185 Protecting the knowledge of one's "own future" is "a
176 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
177 Casey, supra note 87, at 106.
178 See Drell, supra note 11, at 8.
179 See Andrews, supra note 17, at 44.
180 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
181 See id.
182 See N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 360; see also Witso, 609 N.W.2d at 620; Crago, 733
N.E.2d at 1225.
183 See Tyrone W., 741 A.2d at 572 (quoting Monroe v. Monroe, 621 A.2d 898
(Md. 1993)).
184 See N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 362; see also Crago, 733 N.E.2d at 1125; Tyrone W.,
741 A.2d at 572-73; Witso, 609 N.W.2d at 620.
185 See THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 160, at 11; see, e.g., U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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basic civil right of man.' 86 Therefore, an adoptee has a fundamen-
tal right of privacy to be free from genetic testing by the adoption
agency and prospective adoptive parents, given there is no compel-
ling state justification.
B. If Genetic Testing Was Permitted by the Adoptee, The Child's
Interest Would Still Avoid Disclosure of the Test Results
Most judicial development on the constitutional right to pri-
vacy has focused primarily on "the right to autonomy in personal
decision making," while "individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters" has obtained much less attention.187 Most
state legislatures have defined permissible methods for obtaining
medical information in adoption proceedings under the second in-
terest in the right to privacy, though many are unclear. 188 Even
with this problem, scholars note that "regulation of the collection
and disclosure of a genetic test must be performed with careful at-
tention to protect the privacy rights of adoptees, given the sensitive
and personal information disclosed about the adoptee."'189 Hence,
if adoptees are tested for adult-onset disorders, adoption agencies
do not have the right to disclose the test results, given the informa-
tion falls under the child's fundamental right to privacy.
The primary constitutional case that deals with the collection,
retention, and disclosure of personal information is Whalen v.
Roe.1 90 The central role of this case and most courts decisions con-
cerning the protection of privacy in the disclosure of information is
that "interests of the parties involved must be balanced in order to
determine whether an individual's constitutional, common-law, or
statutory right to privacy has been violated."1 91 Courts have upheld
186 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
187 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
188 See Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 689.
189 See Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 687.
190 See Whalen, 429 U.S. 598 (1977) (declaring a New York statute which
allowed the names and addresses of persons to be recorded in a centralized com-
puter database, who obtained prescription drugs where there was a lawful and un-
lawful use, was constitutional. The court concluded the statute did not violate the
patients' right to privacy because the state had a compelling interest in controlling
the distribution of dangerous drugs and there was no support that security provi-
sions would be improperly administered causing the information to be revealed to
the public.).
191 Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 694; see also Whalen,
429 U.S. at 600-2; see also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danworth,
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"state statutory schemes when the collection, retention, and speci-
fied use of the data served compelling public interests and when the
statute included sufficient procedures to guard against unwarranted
disclosure.' 92
In balancing the interests of the parties involved in genetically
testing an adoptee for adult-onset genetic disorders, there is not
one vital public interest in permitting the disclosure of this informa-
tion by the adoption agency as was revealed in Part III (A). 193
Though, it is important to mention that the Court recognized the
potential for technology to interfere with the rights of personal pri-
vacy.1 94 In writing for the majority in Whalen, Justice Stevens made
clear the Court's awareness of the threat of privacy given the vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks and
this personal information, if revealed, may be potentially embar-
rassing or harmful. 195 Brennan's concurrence though, goes on even
further to say that changing times and increasing technology may
play a role in determining privacy rights. 196 This is an instance
428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding the reporting and recordkeeping requirements for
abortions were constitutional because the process of keeping the records was rea-
sonable in that it respected patient's confidentiality and privacy. The added re-
quirements of confidentiality was "the information [wa]s kept confidential for
seven years in permanent files of the health facility where the abortion is
preformed.. .with the sole exception for public health officers."); see also Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (holding the re-
porting requirements for the Pennsylvania statute on abortions went well beyond
health-related interests because the statute included information as to "method of
payment, the woman's personal history, and the bases for medical judgment. Even
though the state claimed these reports were not public, they were nonetheless
available to the public for copying." Based on this, the Court held this obstructed
a woman's right to choose.); see also Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding a statute requiring every facility which
performs abortions to file a report was constitutional. The Court held the state's
interest did not obstruct a woman's choice, but related strictly to health informa-
tion. Given this health information was a vital element to research, the statute did
not impose a substantial undue burden on a woman's choice.).
192 Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil, supra note 21, at 694; see also Whalen,
429 U.S. at 602; Danworth, 428 U.S. at 79-81; Casey, 429 U.S. at 900.
193 See supra notes 127-169 and accompanying text.
194 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
195 See id.
196 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan
wrote:
The Fourth Amendment shows the Constitution puts limits not
only on the type of information the State may gather, but also on
the means it may use to gather it. The central storage and easy
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where the technology does play a role in determining the adoptee's
right to privacy and is an added reason why an adoption agency
does not have the authority to disclose such information, if availa-
ble. Allowing genetic tests would be an abuse of the interpretation
of disclosure laws. As stated in Danforth, "record-keeping of this
kind, if not abused or overdone, can be useful to the State's inter-
est."' 197 Disclosing information to prospective adoptive parents
about the entire future health of a child is overdone, given the po-
tential reaction to the tests results by all of the parties involved.
Therefore, if an adoption agency discloses personal information on
a child's genetic makeup, the agency will be violating the child's
substantive right to privacy.
IV. GENETIC TESTING ON THE ADOPTEE DISCRIMINATES
AGAINST THE ADOPTEE IN THE FUTURE
Many scholars believe genetically testing a child will discrimi-
nate the child in the future, but genetically testing an adoptee for an
untreatable, adult-onset disorder will also mostly likely cause dis-
crimination against the adoptee in both the present and future. If
an adoptee undergoes a genetic test to determine his or her predis-
position for an untreatable, adult-onset disorder, the adoptee will
most likely be presently discriminated in that the child will most
likely be classified as "defective" if the genetic test does show a
predisposition to an untreatable, adult-onset disorder. This dis-
crimination will most likely carry over into adulthood as the child
continues to be discriminated by third parties such as employers
and insurers.
A. Discrimination as a Child
As soon as the prospective adoptive parents or the adoption
agency reads the results of the genetic test, the adoptee will be im-
mediately classified as either "healthy or unhealthy.' 98 This classi-
fication leads to discrimination 99 since in learning the results, the
accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for
abuse of the information, and I am not prepared to say that future
developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on
such technology.
197 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81.
198 See Holland, supra note 24, at 344.
199 See Holland, supra note 24, at 344.
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prospective adoptive parents must make a conscious decision
whether to adopt the child based on the child's genetic makeup. If
they decide to adopt, obviously discrimination has not occurred. If
they decide not to adopt based on the child's test results, discrimi-
nation has most likely occurred. 200
If, in learning the results, the prospective adoptive parents de-
cide not to adopt the child, it is most simply because the child has a
"defect." 201 From this moment on, the child will carry a "scarlet
letter, ' 202 since this private information will now be disclosed to
other prospective adoptive parents as part of the child's medical
record. 20 3 What the genetic test does not indicate is that the
adoptee can be loved and nurtured as any other child.20 4 Biological
parents still love their children even if their children have a predis-
position to an untreatable, adult-onset genetic disorder.20 5 No child
chooses to be born into a family based on the genetic makeup of
their parents and nothing can be done to change a child's genetic
makeup. 206 Genetic information is beyond a person's control. 20 7
The genetic test only compels the search for the "perfect baby" 20 8
leaving children with a predisposition to an untreatable, adult-onset
genetic disorder unloved and unwanted, when in fact they are no
200 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
201 See Holland, supra note 24, at 344.
202 Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality: What's the Big Secret, 3 U.
CHI. L. SCH. RT. 589, 595-95 (1996). As the author explains:
Genetic screening has been described as a process which provides
an ineradicable marker of deviance with potentially lifelong social
consequences to the affected individual. A diagnosis of disease
condition with a genetic component has been characterized as if it
created a biological 'scarlet letter' marking the bearer as an easy
target for discrimination, stigma, and scorn.
203 See Holland, supra note 24, at 347. As the author explains:
When parents authorize genetic testing on their minor children,
they are setting them up for to be harmed by ... discrimination.
[For example,] if an employer [or an insurer] asks and the individ-
ual knows of her genetic background, he or she must disclose it.
Employers [and insurers] may also learn of an applicant's genetic
status by accessing the employee medical records or by a physicians
disclosure.
204 See ASHG/ACMG Report, supra note 12.
205 See ASHG/ACMG Report, supra note 12.
206 See Genetic Discrimination, A Position Paper Presented by the Council for
Responsible Genetics, at http://www.gene-watch.org/programs/GD-PP.html (vis-
ited Aug. 1, 2001).
207 See id.
208 See Pelias & Rothstein, supra note 14.
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different from any other ordinary child.20 9 Unfortunately, the dis-
crimination does not stop here. An adoptee will continue to experi-
ence genetic discrimination as he or she reaches adulthood and the
discrimination will most likely' occur in two important areas: em-
ployment and insurance.210
B. Discrimination With Future Employers
An employer's goal in business is to make a profit and employ-
ees are essential in attaining that goal.211 Employees who are more
susceptible to getting sick will cost the company money either
through sick days, expensive medical bills, driving up the cost of
insurance, and, possibly, disability benefits. 212 Thus, employers feel
that in knowing genetic information about their employees, em-
ployers can lower labor costs by weeding out the "unhealthy"
employees. 213
In response to these developments, employers now have begun
to question applicants about whether they have a predisposition to
certain genetic disorders because as the employer sees it, the disor-
der may impair the applicant's job performance, causing them to
end their job prematurely.214 In a recent study conducted by the
Northwestern National Life Insurance, it was discovered that by the
year 2000, 15 percent of employers planned on checking the genetic
status of a prospective employee and their dependents before mak-
ing the prospective employee an offer.215
209 See ASHG/ACMG Report, supra note 12.
210 See Joseph S. Alper, Jonathan Beckwith, Margaret de Cuevas, Paul R.
Billings, Mel A. Kohn, & Marvin R. Natowicz, Discrimination as a consequence of
Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 476, 481 (1992); see also Honorable James
C. Nelson, Yours, Mine or Ours: Legal Issues Related to Genetic Testing, 25 (Sept.
14, 2000) (paper originally presented at the Montana State Bar's annual meeting in
Butte, Montana), available at http://www.monttla.com/court/MT_- Supreme/ge-
netic%20testing%20_- %20Nelsonhtml; see also Holland, supra note 24, at 344.
211 See Holland, supra note 24, at 346.
212 See Holland, supra note 24, at 346 ("If the disorder is job-related, employ-
ees might receive workman's compensation benefits, which, of course, costs the
companies more money.").
213 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206 (explaining that less absentee-
ism, reduced life and health insurance costs, and longer returns on investments in
employee training all reduce labor costs).
214 See Holland, supra note 24, at 346.
215 See The Genetic NonDisrimination In Health Insurance and Employment
Act of 1999, H.R. 602, 105th Cong. (1999), available at http://www.house.gov/
slaughter/leg-record/leg602.htm (last updated July 13, 2001).
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Even if an adoptee, as an adult, lies to a prospective employer
that he or she does not have a predisposition to a certain genetic
disorder, if the adoptee was genetically tested as a child, the
adoptee will eventually have to disclose the test results to the po-
tential employer since the tests are now part of his or her medical
record. 216 Most employers complete a background check on a pro-
spective employee before hiring them and sometimes this includes
examining the prospective employee's medical records. Therefore,
as a result, adoptees become victimized2 17 since employers in learn-
ing the results, will most likely perceive these individuals as a liabil-
ity to the company,2 18 ignoring the present, capable abilities of the
adoptees, who are now adults.219 Instead, questionable stereotypes
and stigmas will circulate about their performance now and in the
future.220 Overall, this causes the chance of employment for an
adoptee as an adult to diminish. 221
What is even more shocking to many people is that genetic dis-
crimination is an increasing problem. At least twelve of the top
Fortune 500 companies have reportedly used genetic testing strictly
for employment purposes.2 22 In a survey, given to members of sev-
eral genetic support groups, results revealed that 13 percent of the
people survey believed that they were either denied or dismissed
216 See supra note 203.
217 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
218 See Holland, supra note 24, at 347. The author reports:
Statistics released by the Office of Technology Assessment re-
vealed that 50 percent of the 500 companies surveyed in the United
States believed 'genetic testing' is acceptable as a qualification for
employment. An employee with a late-onset disorder would cause
the company to expend more money for health insurance coverage,
and, therefore, is not a smart business move. In a 1989 study, 40
percent of 330 Fortune 500 companies admitted that a person's
health insurance costs might affect chances of employment... These
statistics.. illustrate how seriously companies take the issue of ge-
netic status, and how much it may affect a minor's chances of
employment.
See also Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206 (explaining similarly that a 1989
survey commissioned by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment doc-
umented that at least five Fortune 500 companies conducted some type of genetic
testing on their employees).
219 See also Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
220 See also Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
221 See Holland, supra note 24, at 347.
222 See Nelson, supra note 210, at 26.
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from employment because of their genetic conditions. 223 Around
18 percent of the people surveyed also stated they deliberately re-
fused to reveal any personal genetic information to their employ-
ers.2 24 Further studies confirm the fear that genetic discrimination
in employment is an increasing problem.2 25 All these fears are jus-
tified when there is mounting evidence that employers are screen-
ing their employees for a genetic condition, which could possibly
affect health and productivity of the employee, now or in the
future.226
In response to these developments, 22 states have enacted
some type of legislation providing that no employer may require
genetic testing or use the results of a genetic test to discriminate in
employment. 227 On December 20, 2001, Montgomery County, Ma-
223 See H.R. 602, supra note 215.
224 See H.R. 602, supra note 215.
225 See Dorothy C. Wertz, PhD., "Genetic Discrimination:" A Survey of Re-
fusals of Employment or Insurance, The Shriver Center for Mental Retardation, at
http://apha.confex.com/apha/128am/techprogram/paper_6066.htm (Nov. 14, 2001).
The following author reported that:
An anonymous questionnaire survey of 1538 board certified geneti-
cists and genetic counselors (1084, or 70% responding), 852 pri-
mary care physicians (499 or 59% responding), and 718 first-time
visitors to 12 genetic clinics (476, or 66% responding) found that
genetic professionals reported a total of 36 individuals refused em-
ployment and 237 refused life insurance on the basis of genetic pre-
disposition, in the absence of symptoms; 40 were refused
employment and 237 were refused life insurance on the basis of
carrier status only, for a total of 550 refused employment of insur-
ance. Primary care physicians, with a median of 14 years in the
practice and 100-150 patients a week, reported a total of 63 refusals
of health or life insurance or employment on genetic grounds.
Among patients, 2% reported being denied a job, 7% refused in-
surance coverage for some services, 5% were refused life insurance
and 1% were refused school admission "because of a genetic disa-
bility or disease."
See also U.S. President Calls for Ban on Genetic Discrimination (June 24, 2001)
("According to the Journal Science, a survey of 2,133 employers this year by the
American Management Association found that seven are using genetic testing for
either job applicants or employees."), available at http://
www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/200106/24/eng.200106424_73381.html.
226 See Nelson, supra note 210, at 26 (discussing that in Norman-Bloodshaw v.
Lawrence Berkley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260 (9 th Cir. 1998) an employer was
screened an employee's DNA for syphilis, pregnancy, and sickle-cell anemia).
227 See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-1463 (2000); CAL. EMP. CODE § 12940 (WEST
2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(A)- 6 0 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19 § 711 (2000);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.6 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (2000); ME. REV.
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ryland was the first local jurisdiction in the nation to enact a genetic
discrimination legislation, adding genetic information into the
county's anti-discrimination law. 228 There are problems, however,
with many of these laws in that a narrow definition of genetic dis-
crimination excludes many from receiving relief when they are vic-
tims to genetic discrimination. 229 An effective federal law
protecting a person's genetic information from discrimination does
not exist at this point in time.230
There is one possible avenue an adoptee may take in order to
fight genetic discrimination when he or she reaches adulthood and
he or she is genetically discriminated by an employer. At the fed-
eral level, an employee may have a claim of genetic discrimination
against an employer under the American Disabilities Act
("ADA").231 The ADA prohibits an employer from gaining access
to certain types of nonessential information about an applicant with
a disability, where the nonessential information is about the disabil-
ity, a condition that does not affect his or her employment in any
STAT. ANN. TIT. 5 § 19302 (WEST 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 151B § 4(A) (2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 31.202 (2000); Mo. REV. STAT. §375.1306 (2000); NEV. REV.
STAT. 613 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, § 141-H:3 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 169:11(A) (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:3 (2000); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296 (McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1A (2000); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 36,
§ 3614.2 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.227, 659.036 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-
6.7-1 (2000); TEX. CODE ANN. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 21.402 (West 2000); VT. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 18 § 9333 (2000); Wis. STAT. § 111.372 (2000); see also Nelson, supra
note 210, at 28; see also Mark Rothstein, Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why
They Are So Hard To Protect? 26 J. L. MED. & ETH. 198, 202 (1998).
228 See Karyn-Siobhan Robinson, Railway Company Agrees to End Genetic
Testing for Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, at http://www.shrm.org/hrnews/articles/de-
fault.asp?page=021301a.htm (Feb. 13, 2001) (explaining that the new Montgomery
county law went into effect on March 21, 2001).
229 See Rothstein, supra note 227, at 202. ("For example a Texas enacted law
in 1997 prohibiting employment discrimination based on genetic information is de-
fined as the results of a DNA-based test. Therefore, it would not violate the law
for an employer to discriminate against an individual because his/her medical re-
cord contains a remark that 'father died of Huntington disease.' "); See Nelson,
supra note 210, at 28 (explaining "[flaws that prohibit unauthorized access to
health care or genetic information do not prohibit an employer from making the
execution of a general medical release a valid condition of employment with the
consequence that the employer has the right of access to all of the individual's
medical files via the prospective employee's consent.").
230 See Holland, supra note 24, at 348.
231 See American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); see
also Holland, supra note 24, at 348; see also Rothstein, supra note 227, at 201.
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way. 2 3 2 Basically, in enacting the ADA, Congress realized it was
important to control an employers access to information completely
unrelated to either the applicant or employee's job performance. 233
Thus, the ADA was designed to protect individuals with "hidden
disabilities. '' 234 In 1995, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") interpreted the ADA to cover on genetic dis-
crimination by employers. 235
Unfortunately, the ADA falls short in dealing with genetic dis-
crimination,236 since it is not strict about preventing the disclosure
of personal information that may cause embarrassment or humilia-
tion to an applicant or employee. 237 For example, under the ADA,
an employer can discover medical information at three different
stages - pre-employment, employment entrance, and employ-
ment.238 At the pre-employment stage, it is unlawful for the em-
ployer to inquire into the medical background of the applicant or
ask the applicant whether they have a disability as long as it has no
bearing on their essential job performance.2 39 Though, if an em-
ployer offers a job to the applicant, the employer may make a con-
dition for employment - that the applicant must first complete a
medical examination. 240 The ADA places no limits on the scope of
this medical examination, which may include genetic testing.241
Furthermore, an employer may require, as a condition of employ-
232 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b); see also Nelson, supra note 210, at 28.
233 See Rothstein, supra note 227 at 281, 287 (1997); see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101(a).
234 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101; see also Rothstein, supra note 227, at 287.
235 See Government-Citizen Group Suggests Policies to Limit Genetic Discrim-
ination in the Workplace, The National Human Genome Research Institute, at
http://www.nhgir.nih.gov/NEWS/discrim.html (visited August 7, 2001) (defining ge-
netic information to include an "individual's inherited predisposition to a dis-
ease"); see also Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
236 See Rothstein, supra note 227, at 201.
237 See Nelson, supra note 210, at 27.
238 See Rothstein, supra note 227, at 201.
239 See Rothstein, supra note 227, at 288, 201 The author explains:
An employer is prohibited from performing a medical exam, asking
about the use of prescription medication, asking about the use of
prescription medications, asking about the use of sick leave, or sim-
ilar matters. The employer is limited to asking whether the individ-
ual has the ability to perform essential job functions. For example,
if essential to the job, the employer may ask whether the individual
can climb a pole, has a driver's license ...
240 See Rothstein, supra note 227, at 201.
241 See Rothstein, supra note 227, at 201.
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ment, that the applicant sign a release, authorizing the disclosure of
all of the individual's personal medical information to the company
for review. 242 Therefore, if for some reason a person had previ-
ously been genetically tested for some disease, such as a child who
was adopted, the results of that test may be disclosed to the em-
ployer since it is part of the person's medical file.243 Furthermore,
the ADA does not specifically state that a predisposition to a ge-
netic disorder is unlawful.2 44 Because of this, adoptees are severely
disadvantaged in combating genetic discrimination in the future.245
Therefore, once an employer receives this information, he or
she will make a decision whether to hire the applicant or not. Most
likely, if the adoptee has genetic test results in his or her medical
record and the results are not favorable, the employer may be more
apprehensive to allow the applicant to flourish as an employee
within the company, increasing the chances for genetic discrimina-
tion to occur.246 Thus, there is unfairness to adoptees, in having
been genetically tested as children, since employment is "crucial to
self-support" and most likely the adoptee will be denied employ-
ment du to the results of a genetic test that was taken at child-
hood.247 Except, genetic discrimination not only affects adoptees,
but the general working public also.248 Since the employer's atten-
tion is focused on who has a predisposition for a genetic disease, the
employer may not be focused more important issues such as need
the to improve and eliminate workplace and environmental dangers
and hazards. 249 The issue of workplace dangers is much more im-
portant than the genetic makeup of an employee given that work-
place dangers affects the health of all employees, not just
242 See Rothstein, supra note 227, at 201.
243 See supra note 203.
244 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); See also Rothstein, supra note 227,
at 289.
245 Though, some scholars feel that genetic discrimination is safeguarded
under the ADA given the recent Court of Appeals case, Echazabal v. Chevron
USA, 213 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9"6 Cir. 1998), holding the ADA only permits excluding
employees only if they threaten the health or safety of other (quoting Robinson,
supra note 228).
246 See Holland, supra note 24, at 347-48.
247 See Michael S. Yeasley, Prohibitions of Genetic Discrimination Should Be
Fine-Tuned, Gene Letter, (March 1, 2001), at http://www.geneletter.org/03-01-01/
features/discrimination.html.
248 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
249 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
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individuals who have a predisposition to an untreatable, adult-onset
genetic disorder.250
Genetic discrimination causes many other problems. Any type
of relationship an adoptee has with employers and other employees
will be strained and the chance for promotion will be reduced, 251
since "unfounded generalizations" about the adoptee's perform-
ance will circulate.252 This causes the stigmatization of the adoptee
and it most likely will be carried with him or her throughout his or
her employment.253
The only possible benefit in testing these children is to deter-
mine if they had a "genetic disorder that would manifest if exposed
to certain stimuli and as adults they avoided jobs that exposed them
to this stimuli." 25 4 Though, no harm is done by waiting for minors
to make the decision for themselves to test for genetic disorders
later on in life. Therefore, an employer should not deny qualified
individuals who may have a predisposition for a genetic disease,
since the importance of a person's opportunity for employment
overrides any possible monetary or safety interest by the
employer. 255
C. Discrimination in Insurance
There is an even greater chance for adoptees to be the victims
to genetic discrimination later on in life by health and life insurance
companies.256 Today, both health and life insurance companies of-
fer lower premiums to individuals who have a better than average
loss history.257 This basically means that insurance policies are
rated, whereby individuals will be charged different premiums de-
pending on a person's likelihood of either making a claim to the
insurance company or experiencing an early death.258 Because of
250 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
251 See Holland, supra note 24, at 347-48.
252 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
253 See Holland, supra note 24, at 347-48.
254 Holland, supra note 24, at 349.
255 See Yeasley, supra note 247.
256 See Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination:" Toward the Broader
Harm of Geneticism, 23 J.L. MED. & ETH. 345 (1995).
257 See Holland, supra note 24, at 344-45.
258 See Nelson, supra note 210, at 29; see also Genetic Discrimination, supra
note 206.
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this system, many people find it difficult to receive insurance.25 9
Aside from this, what is fundamental to this rated system is the abil-
ity to assess the health risks of an individual.2 60 Therefore, health
and life insurance companies will naturally want to base their rate
on a person's genetic profile. 261 If a person is classified as having a
genetic predisposition to a certain disease, he or she will likely be
subject to paying higher premiums or even being denied coverage,
due to the possibility of having extensive medical bills to treat the
disorder if it manifests. 262 Unfortunately, as people make, a con-
scious decision to pick up a cigarette and smoke, ignore the advice
of their doctor to eat more healthy, or injest their bodies with nar-
cotics, a person cannot make a conscious decision to change their
genetic makeup. 263
As with employment, genetic discrimination by both life and
health insurers is a growing problem. A 1996 survey indicated that
22% of persons felt that they were denied health insurance because
they were genetically tested for a disease.264 Today, there is no ef-
fective federal law to prohibit the use genetic discrimination by in-
surance companies.2 65
With the advent of the Human Genome Project, Wisconsin, in
1990, passed a statute forbidding health insurers to "require or re-
259 See Nelson, supra note 210, at 29; see also Genetic Discrimination, supra
note 206 (explaining how the rating practices for insurance are becoming increas-
ingly stringent and because of these difficult standards, nearly 100 million Ameri-
cans either do not have insurance or are significantly underinsured).
260 See Nelson, supra note 210, at 29 (stating that the insurance industry
"wants to predict who is likely to develop a serious disease and if the disease is
expected to be prolonged or expensive").
261 See Holland, supra note 24, at 345; See also. Nelson, supra note 210, at 30
(explaining that while insurance companies may not be actually conducting genetic
tests on individuals, they do have an interest in obtaining a person's genetic profile
based on the "assumption that people who seek a genetic test are conducting these
tests because they know they have an increased probability of a genetic
condition").
262 See Holland, supra note 24, at 345.
263 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
264 See Mark A. Rothstein & Ronald L. Scott, Prohibitions on Genetic Dis-
crimination in Insurance and Employment, at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlawper-
spect... Genetics/980219ProhibitionsGenetic.html (Feb. 19, 1998); see also Wertz,
supra note 225.
265 See Lori B. Andrews, Francis S. Collins, Kathy L. Hudson, Mary Jo. Ellis
Kahn & Karen H. Rosenburg, Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance, VHL
Family Alliance, (March 1996), available at http://www.vhl.org.newsletter/vh1996/
96aqinsu.html.
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quest directly or indirectly any individual or member of the individ-
ual's family to obtain a genetic test. ' 266 Since then, almost all of the
states have followed Wisconsin's lead and drafted statutes prohibit-
ing insurers from requesting genetic tests.267 Unfortunately, many
these statutes are poorly drafted in that they do not protect the ap-
propriate class of people, since insurance companies can still easily
get genetic information about an individual.268
266 WIS. STAT. § 631.89 (1990) ("[G]enetic test means a test using deox-
yribonucleic acid extracted from an individual's cells in order to determine the
presence of a genetic disease or disorder or the individual's predisposition for a
particular genetic disorder.").
267 See ALA. CODE § 27-53-2 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 21.54.100 (2000); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1379, -448 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-86-304, -308
(1997); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1357.03, 10123.3 (2000); COL. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7
(1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 3 8 (A)- 8 15, -816 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 18
§ 2317 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.65625, 641.31073 (2000); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 33-54-4 (Michie 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:10A-118, 432:1-60, 432:D026
(1997); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-3940, -221, -4708 (2000); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
513/1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 22, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 (1998); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356
(1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-26-5 TO -8 (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 513B.9A, 513B.10 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2259 (1997); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 304.17-200, 304.17A-2230 (1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:213.7 (1997);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 24-A §§ 2850, 2159-C (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. LAW §§ 27-909, -208 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 175 § 108(H), 120(E), CH.
176B § 3B, CH. 1761 § 4A (2000); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 3407B, 2107 2A, 401 (2000);
MINN, STAT. 72A.139 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. §375.1303 (2000); MONT. CODE
ANN. H3 33-18-903, -904, -206, -22-526, (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-5246.02
(1997); NEV. REV. STAT. 689B.069, 689B.550, 689C.193 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 141-H:4-5 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48A-6.11, 17B:30-12 (2000); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-21-4 (Michie 1998); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 2612 (McKinney 2000);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-68-35 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-36.4-03.1 (Michie
2000); OHIo REV. ANN. §§ 1751.64, 3901.503901.501 (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. TIT.
36, § 3614.1-2 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135 (2000); 40 PA. CONS STAT. § 3902
(2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-49, -52, 19-44 (Michie 1998); S.C. CODE §§ 38-71-
860, 93-20 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-18B-27, -18-45 (Michie 2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-7-2701 TO -2707, -2804 (2000); TEX. CODE ANN. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. § 21.73 (West 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18 § 9334 (1998); VA.
CODE. ANN. §§ 32.1-67.1, 38.2-508.4 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 3 3-15- 2 A (2000); Wis.
STAT. §§ 631. 89, 632.746 (1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-19-107, -306 (2000).
268 See Rothstein, supra note 227, at 199. As the author explains:
The laws only apply to individual who are asymptomatic. Once the
individual becomes symptomatic, the laws do not apply. For exam-
ple, in a state with such provision, an insurance company cannot
use the positive result of a test to detect a genetic predisposition to
breast cancer to deny coverage while the woman is asymptomatic.
If she becomes symptomatic, however, then the insurance company
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For example, insurance companies routinely review a person's
medical record when they apply for insurance.269 Since a genetic
test becomes part of a person's medical record, as in the case of an
adoptee when he or she is genetically tested as a child, a person
must disclose the results of a genetic test when the insurance com-
pany requests a copy of the applicant's medical record. 270 There-
fore, even if a person lies to the insurance company that they have
never undergone genetic testing (since most insurance companies
ask this question), the insurance company can still find out this pri-
vate information.271
Finally, not only is this discrimination unfair, but many genetic
tests are at times inaccurate. 272 Genes can only tell society part of
the reason of why people get sick.273 Even if scientists could predict
with accuracy what genes a person has, scientists would still be una-
ble to predict a person's future health needs since there is not set
time when the disease would manifest. 274 Therefore, genetic testing
cannot accurately predict how disabling the genetic disease will be
for a person.275
Overall, by performing genetic tests on an adoptee to deter-
mine a predisposition to an adult-onset disorder, the adoptee will
most likely be discriminated in the future most likely by both his or
her employer and insurer. This is just one more burden the adoptee
will have to bear if genetically tested. The adoptive parents are not
only potentially discriminating against the child now, but their ac-
tions will have serious effects on the child later in life.
can cancel the policy or increase the rates 100 percent or more,
depending on the provisions of the state's general insurance laws.
See also Wolf, supra note 256, at 346. The author states:
The approach of the current statutes is akin to saying that insurers
cannot use a certain set of tests or category of information to ascer-
tain a person's [genetics]. [Though,] the insurer can still rely on
other indicators [such as other phenotypic indicators or other pat-
terns of inheritance] to try to glean those characteristics and then
disadvantage the person accordingly.
269 See Nelson, supra note 210, at 30.
270 See supra note 203.
271 See Nelson, supra note 210, at 11.
272 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
273 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206
274 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
275 See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 206.
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D. The Future of Genetic Discrimination
Recent events clearly indicate that American society is realiz-
ing the concern over the dangers of genetic information. Even
though the United States government has made no definitive state-
ment about the appropriate and inappropriate uses of genetic infor-
mation, the tide may be changing due to actions taken by President
Clinton, President Bush, Congress, and the EEOC, in order to fight
genetic discrimination in employment and with insurers.276
On February 8, 2000, President Bill Clinton made history by
signing an executive order banning all types of genetic discrimina-
tion in federal employment. 277 Exactly one year and one day later,
on February 9, 2001, the EEOC filed its first court action with re-
gards to genetic discrimination.278 The EEOC sought a preliminary
injunction against Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad to end
the company's one-year policy of genetically testing employees who
have filed claims for the work-related injury, carpal tunnel syn-
drome.2 79 Six charges of discrimination were filed in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, where the
EEOC claimed that requiring employees to undergo genetic test-
ing, who have submitted a claim for carpal tunnel syndrome, vio-
lates the ADA.280 As EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven Miller
276 See H.R. 602, supra note 215.
277 See H.R. 602, supra note 215; See also Yeasley, supra note, 247; see also
Genetic Discrimination Bills, American Medical Association, at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2312.html (June 29, 2000).
278 See Press Release, EEOC Petitions Court to Ban Genetic Testing of Rail-
road Workers in First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic Testing Under the Ameri-
can Disabilities Act, (Feb. 9, 2001) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-9-02-
c.html ("The EEOC is a federal agency responsible for enforcing the ADA, which
prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, including
prohibiting an employer from seeking disability related information not related to
an employee's ability to perform his or her job.").
279 See EEOC Petitions Court to Ban Genetic Testing of Railroad Workers in
First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic Testing Under the American Disabilities
Act, supra note 278; see also Susan M. McComb, EEOC Files Suit to Halt Genetic
Testing, at http://www.chamber2u.com/KCHR305EEOCgeneticdiscriml0300.asp
(March 2001); see also Associated Press, Burlington Drops Genetic Testing of Em-
ployees, available at http://www.mindfully.org/GE/Burlington-Northern-Test-
ing.htm (Feb. 12, 2001); see also Robinson, supra note 228 (explaining the blood
samples were to be used for a genetic DNA test to detect Chromosome 17 dele-
tion, which some scientists believe can predict carpal tunnel syndrome).
280 See EEOC Petitions Court to Ban Genetic Testing of Railroad Workers in
First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic Testing Under the American Disabilities
Act, supra note 278 ("Four of the charges were filed by affected individuals; two
178 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
explained, "[E]mployers may only require employees to submit to
any medical examination if those examinations are job related and
consistent with business necessity. Any test which purports to pre-
dict future disabilities, whether or not it is accurate, is unlikely to be
relevant to the employee's present ability to perform his or her
job." 281
After the company agreed to halt all genetic testing of employ-
ees282 and offered an apology to the employees that were geneti-
cally tested, on April 6, 2001, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Railroad agreed to settle a union lawsuit for genetically testing their
employees. 283 According to the terms of the settlement, the rail-
road agreed to: (1) stop all genetic testing of employees; (2) destroy
the test results and blood samples of all the workers who were
tested and remove the test results from the employee's records; and
(3) would support federal legislation limiting the scope of employ-
ers wanting to genetically test their employees.284 Currently, the
lawsuit with the EEOC is still pending.285
were filed by officials of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of the Way Employees
on behalf of all affected union members."); see also Associated Press, Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Settles Federal Lawsuit Over Secret Genetic Testing, available at
http://www.brainerddispatch.com/stories/041801/nne_0418010026.shtml (explaining
that the suit arose after the railroad threatened to fire a worker who would not
submit a blood sample for a genetic test to see if he had carpal tunnel syndrome.
Furthermore, the railway, which has about 40,000 employees, said "of the 125
workers who filed claims for carpal tunnel syndrome since March 2000, 18 were
tested.").
281 EEOC Petitions Court to Ban Genetic Testing of Railroad Workers in
First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic Testing Under the American Disabilities
Act, supra note 278.
282 See Burlington Northern - EEOC Pact Preserves Right to Damages for
Genetic Job Testing, Biotech Watch, at http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/btbns
(April 24, 2001); see also Robinson, supra note 228.
283 See Associated Press, Burlington Northern Settles Union Lawsuit available
at http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/041001/bus-burlington.shtml (April 10,
2001).
284 See id. (explaining there was no mention of damages in the settlement
other than the railroad agreeing to pay $39,500 in legal fees); see also Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Settles Federal Lawsuit over Secret Genetic Testing, supra note
280.
285 See Burlington Northern Settles Union Lawsuit, supra note 283 (stating
that Laurie Vasichek, senior trial attorney for the EEOC's Minneapolis office,
stated that the "union settlement does not affect the EEOC lawsuit, which prima-
rily seeks a court order that will bar all genetic testing of workers and thus, prevent
any genetic based discrimination"); see also Burlington Northern Santa Fe Settles
Federal Lawsuit over Secret Genetic Testing, supra note 280 (explaining that the
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As of today, the EEOC's position remains legally untested. 286
This not only leaves many to wonder whether courts would uphold
the EEOC's position, but also leaves employers to wonder what is
the current law with regards to genetic testing in the workplace. 28 7
In the wake of these new developments, the EEOC advises that
employers should either develop a workplace policy on this issue or
more importantly, include genetic information in their current non-
discrimination policies.288
Currently, under discussion in both the House of Representa-
tives ("House") and Senate are bills with a broad scope to prohibit
genetic discrimination throughout employment, at the federal level,
and insurance. 289 Known as the Genetic Nondiscrimination in
Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999 that was first intro-
duced in the House, this legislation, if enacted, would establish "a
comprehensive law banning discrimination based on genetic infor-
mation in both health insurance and employment. '290
During this year, the sponsors of the bill have launched a com-
prehensive and forceful campaign to push for the bill's passage.291
As of July 2001, the bill in the House has attracted the support of
253 bipartisan Representatives, constituting a majority, while 23
Senators have supported a similar bill in the Senate. 292 As discus-
EEOC has not resolved the discrimination complaints of dozen of workers that
filed against the company and still may seek damages); see also Burlington North-
ern - EEOC Pact Preserves Right to Damages for Genetic Job Testing, supra note
282 (explaining the "EEOC may seek compensatory and punitive damages up to
$300,000 for a class ranging from 20 to 30 BNSF workers who were either sub-
jected to genetic testing or retaliated against for failing to submit to such tests").
286 See Robinson, supra note 228.
287 See Robinson, supra note 228.
288 See Robinson, supra note 228.
289 See Yeasley, supra note 247; See also Genetic Discrimination Bills, supra
note 277 (explaining there is a House version of this bill entitled H.R. 2457 Ge-
netic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, as well
as a Senate version S. 1322 Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and
Employment Act of 1999).
290 H.R. 602, supra note 215. (explaining this legislation is sponsored by Rep-
resentatives Louise Slaughter (D-NY) and Connie Morella (R-MD) in the House
of Representatives and Senators Tom Daschle (D-SD), Edward Kennedy (D-MA),
Christopher Dodd (D-CT), and Tom Harkin (D-IA) in the Senate); see also Ge-
netic Discrimination Petition, available at http://www.house.gov/inslee/
health.genetic-petition.html , (visited Aug. 8, 2001).
291 See H.R. 602, supra note 215.
292 See H.R. 602, supra note 215.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
sion on the bills begins in July 2001,293 a basic summary of the legis-
lation is as follows:
(1) With regards to health insurance discrimination,
the bills would:
(a) cover all health insurance programs, including
those regulated by the federal government
under ERISA, state-regulated plans, and the
individual market;
(b) prohibit enrollment restriction and premium
adjustment on the basis of predictive genetic
information or genetic services;
(c) health insurance plans and insurers from re-
questing or requiring that an individual take a
genetic test, or reveal the results of a genetic
test; and
(d) prohibit health plans and insurers from pursu-
ing or being provided information on predic-
tive genetic information or genetic services.2 94
(2) With regards to employment discrimination, the
bills would:
(a) cover employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and training programs;
(b) prevent discrimination in hiring, compensa-
tion, and other personnel processes;
(c) prohibit the requirement or request of predic-
tive genetic information, and allows genetic
testing only to monitor the adverse effects of
hazardous workplace exposures; and
(d) requires predictive information possessed by
employers to be confidentially maintained and
disclosed only to the employee upon request,
293 See H.R. 602, supra note 215 (explaining that on July 11, 2001 the Energy
and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection
held the first hearing on genetic discrimination in the House); see also Genetic
Discrimination Bills, supra note 277 (explaining that on July 20, 2001 the Senate
held a hearing on genetic discrimination with was headed by Senator James Jef-
fords (R-VT), Chair Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) which fo-
cused on "whether genetic discrimination in employment exists, whether the ADA
sufficiently covers individuals who are predictively positive for genetic conditions,
and whether additional legislation is needed.").
294 See H.R. 602, supra note 215.
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and to researchers (under the "Common
Rule"). 295
Future actions and decisions will determine the bill's future,
but many are hopefully especially in the wake of President George
Bush's speech on June 23, 2001, where President Bush urged Con-
gress to legislate against genetic discrimination in employment and
health insurance.2 96 Though, most experts agree that regardless of
how much discrimination is being conducted by employers and
health insurers today, as genetic testing becomes less expensive and
more widespread, genetic discrimination will continue, especially
for adoptees.297 Therefore, with new legislation in the horizon,
hopefully genetic discrimination will come to an end.
V. CONCLUSION
Children, as well as adults, have rights under the Constitu-
tion.298 Even though their cries of infringement may not be heard,
they still exist. Children up for adoption have even less of a chance
to have their voices heard, since they are alone in the world. There-
fore, for third parties such as adoption agencies and prospective
adoptive parents to force genetic testing upon these children in-
fringes on the children's substantive right to privacy under due pro-
cess under the Fourteenth Amendment given that these genetic
tests are not beneficial to the child in the adoption process.
295 See H.R. 602, supra note 215.
296 See U.S. President Calls for Ban on Genetic Discrimination, supra note
225 (citing President Bush as stating that the government will work to shape legis-
lation to ban genetic discrimination and he will work with Congress to pass a law
that is "fair, reasonable, and consistent with existing discrimination statutes."
President Bush further stated that scientific advances "should never come at the
cost of basic fairness and equality under law."); see also Krieger, Genetic Testing
Leaps Ahead of Social Implications, supra note 96 (explaining that President Bush
supports privacy for genetic information).
297 See Michele Simon, Genetic Discrimination: Myth or Reality?, Genetic
Health, (Nov. 7, 2000), available at http://www.genetichealth.com/
ELSIGeneticDiscriminationMyth-orReality.shtml.
298 See Lorandos, supra note 2, at 314; See also Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 52-75 (1976) (arguing whether a consent provision signed by the
parents for a minor to receive an abortion is constitutional).
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Currently, the legal standard in adoption proceedings is that
the child's interest should be paramount.2 99 Yet, the interests of
other third parties are being served by allowing these third parties
to test children for untreatable, adult-onset diseases. According to
the law, a right to privacy is fundamental by weighing the interests
of the party and the state,30 0 but a compelling state interest may
override a fundamental right.30 1 In this case a fundamental right
exists and there is no compelling state interest to state otherwise.
Therefore, an adoptee's genetic makeup is a fundamental right pro-
tected under the Constitution.
Furthermore, testing on the adoptee discriminates against the
child presently and in the future violating the adoptee's equal pro-
tection rights. By performing a genetic test, prospective adoptive
parents discriminate the child by placing him or her in a class of
either "good" or "bad," based on the probability of a genetic disor-
der. The discrimination though, does not end there. Later on in
life, the child will most likely be subject to discrimination and stig-
matization in the work force and health insurance industry. Em-
ployers will see the results of the genetic test, and consider the
child, who is now an adult, as a burden on them, costing the em-
ployer money. Health insurers will view the tests and see the child,
who has grown into an adult, as an added liability and charge higher
premiums or deny coverage overall. Therefore, in following the law
of the Constitution, an adoptee has the fundamental right to be free
from genetic testing by adoptive parents or adoption agencies, who
299 See N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 362; See also Crago, 733 N.E.2d at 1125; Tyrone W.,
741 A.2d at 572-573; Witso, 609 N.W.2d at 620; see also ASHG/ACMG Report,
supra note 12.
300 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (describing procreation as fundamental to the
very existence and survival of race thus, is a fundamental right); see also Griswold,
381 U.S. at 486 ("[Marriage is] an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony of living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects."); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness. [It] is one of the basic civil rights of man.").
301 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 ("Strict scrutiny of the classification which a
State makes in a sterilization law is essential."); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 11
(applying a strict scrutiny standard to racial classifications for marriage in the state
of Virginia); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 ("Where 'fundamental rights' are in-
volved, the court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest.' ").
2001] CHANGING THE ADOPTION PROCESS 183
are testing the child for predisposition to untreatable, adult-onset
diseases.
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